The first and most important rule in the interpretation of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is, that the Intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be not inconsistent with the rules of law. 1 Blk. Rep., <672. A will is defined to be “the legal declaration of a man’s intentions which he wills to be performed after his death.”- 2 *596Blk. Com., 499. These intentions are to be collected from his words, and ought to be carried into effect if they be consistent, with law.
In this case, it is impossible to mistake the intention of the-testator. He unquestionably intended that the land devised to John N. B. Johnson should vest in him absolutely, upon his-attaining the age of twenty-five years; and it was also his intention that, if John died without lawful issue, the land should go. to his brother Frederick and his sister Victoria. But as the testator failed to declare his intention as to the time when the contingency of dying without issue must happen, upon which the limitation over was to take effect, we must necessarily look to-the context of the will, and resort to the rules of construction, which have been established by judicial decisions.
It is a rule of construction that the whole will is to be considered together, and every part of it made to have effect, so as to effectuate the intention of the testator; and if there are any apparent inconsistencies in its provisions, it is the duty of the court to reconcile them if possible.
The testator wills that if John Johnson should die without an heir, that is, by virtue of our statute, without issue, then the-land is to go to Frederick and Victoria. If this were all, the-estate vested in John absolutely upon his surviving the testator. Hilliard v. Kearney, Busb. Eq., 221. In that case, it was held,, when the estate was defeasible and no time is fixed for it to become absolute, and the alternative is either to adopt the time-of the death of the devisor or that of the devisee, the former will be adopted, unless there be words to forbid it, or some consideration to turn the scale in favor of the latter. But if there-be an intermediate period between the death of the devisor and that of the devisee, to which the contingency can have reference,, then that must be adopted. The decision in that case has been, cited with approval in the following cases: Davis v. Parker, 69 N. C., 271; Webb v. Weeks, 3 Jones, 279; Biddle v. Hoyt, 1 Jones’ Eq., 159; Vass v. Freeman, 3 Jones’ Eq., 221; Bur *597 ton v. Conigland, 82 N. C.; 99; Murchison v. Whitted, 87 N. C., 465.
Here, the testator, while he wills that upon the death of John without issue the estate devised to him shall go over to his brother Frederick and his sister Victoria, expressly declares that ■John, upon arriving at twenty-five years of age, “ can take possession of the estate and do with it as he pleases.” That is the time when his estate was to become absolute; and consequently it must be intended that the contingency upon which the limitation over was to take effect must happen before that event. So that, whether the will is susceptible of the construction that the ■contingency is referable to the death of the testator, or to the .attainment of John to the age of twenty-five years — -and it must be the one or the other — in either case, the estate of John was absolute at his death, and the defendants acquired no interest in the land devised to him, upon his death.
There is no error. This must be certified to the superior ■court of Rowan county, that the case may be proceeded with according to law and in conformity to this opinion.
No error. Affirmed.