The defendants moved in arrest of judgment -upon the general ground of insufficiency of the indictment, without specifying wherein such insufficiency appeared, and we are left to search for and find it, if, indeed, it exists at all. This is bad practice. The motion should point out with certainty and definiteness the particular ground assigned for arrest. After a careful examination of the indictment, we think it is sufficient in form and substance. There are some unnecessary words employed, but they in no way impair its efficiency; they are merely surplusage.
It is clear that an offence, under the statute, is charged. Section 93, of chapter 32, of Battle’s Revisa!, embraces the buildings therein specified by name, and, in addition, “the houses or buildings mentioned in section 28 of this chapter,” and also any “ other house or building not mentioned in the above recited section of this chapter.”
Now, it is manifest that the words “ other house or building,” in the last recited clause, embrace a jail, a jail-house or building. The term “jail” implies a house or building used for the pur*534poses of a public prison, or where persons under arrest are kept. A jail is embraced also by another clause of the ninety-third section of said chapter. It embraces “any of the houses or buildings mentioned in section 28 of this chapter.” The twenty-eighth section also specifies certain houses and buildings by name, and then provides further, “ or any of the houses or buildings mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter.” Jail is mentioned, specified, in section 11, a previous section of that chapter. Jail is not mentioned by name in the twenty-eighth section; but it is mentioned by the reference to section 11. The term mentioned is used in the sense of referred to or noticed. This is apparent from the comprehensive purpose manifested in the twenty-eighth section, and the general purpose of the statute to protect houses and buildings from wilful injury, damage and defacement.
The testimony mentioned in the first and third exceptions was-receivedawithout objection. It was too late to object to it, even if it were not strictly competent, in the argument 'to the jury. It was manifestly improper for counsel to undertake to impeach the state’s witness by reading to the jury a paper-writing purporting to contain what that witness had sworn to at the preliminary examination of the defendants before the justice of the peace, that pmper not having been introduced as evidence. The court properly excluded it.
The exception, on account of the comments of counsel upon witnesses and the defendants cannot, be sustained. It appears that the judge carefully cautioned the jury in this respect. If he had not done so, the record - develops no such comments as would entitle the defendants to a new trial. The manner of conducting the argument of counsel, the language employed, the temper and tone allowed, must be left largely to the discretion of the presiding judge. He sees what is done, and hears what is said. He is cognizant of all the surrounding circumstances,, and is a better judge of the latitude that ought to be allowed to counsel in the argument in any particular case. It is only in *535extreme cases of the abase of the privilege of counsel, and when this is not checked by the court, and the jury is not properly cautioned, that this court can interfere and grant a new trial. State v. Suggs, ante, 527; State v. Underwood, 77 N. C., 502.
No error. Affirmed.