There is no force in tlie first exception. His Honor, having found that the admission of the defendant was voluntary — not induced by any word or act of intimidation, or promise held out to him, and that it was not made in the course of any judicial proceeding — the conversation in the hearing of the defendant and his statement at the time were clearly admissible.
The admissions of a party are always admissible against him. Adams v. Utley, 87 N. C., 356; State v. Efler, 85 N. C., 585. A free and voluntary confession by a person accused of an offence, whether made before his apprehension or after his commitment; whether reduced to writing or not; in short, any voluntary confession, made by a defendant, to any person at any time or place, is strong evidence against him. Whar. PI. and Ev., §683.
The declarations of the defendant, in this case, do not fall *530within the rule applicable to the admission of statements made by a prisoner during a preliminary inquiry before a justice of the peace, where, by statute, it is made the duty of the justice to write down the statement; for here, there was no trial, no judicial proceeding, no inquiry, in which the justice was required by law to write down anything. But even if it had been such an inquiry, parol proof of the declaration of the defendant would have been admissible; for it was affirmatively proved by the testimony of the witness, Rouse, that the justice “did not take down anything in writing.” State v. Parish, Busb., 239; State v. Irwin, 1 Hay., 112.
The conversation deposed to by the witness, in the presence and hearing of the defendant, would have been admissible if the defendant had remained silent: fora declaration in the presence of a party to a cause becomes evidence, as showing that the ]oarty, on hearing such a statement, did not deny its truth; for if he is silent when he ought to have denied, there is a presumption of his acquiescence. And where a statement is made, either to a man or within his hearing, that he was concerned in the commission of a crime, to which he makes no reply, the natural inference is that the imputation is well founded, or he would have repelled it. Guy v. Manuel, ante, 83; Whar. Ev., §1130, and cases there’cited. Much stronger, then, is the case where he does reply, and makes a confession or statement, as in the case before us, from which his implication in the commission of the crime may be inferred.
As to the second exception: We are of the opinion it was not such an abuse of the “privilege of counsel” as constituted a ground for a new trial. • The objection to the remarks was not made until the next day after the verdict was rendered, upon the motion for a new trial. It carne too late.' It was not made in apt time, and for that reason cannot be entertained, as has been frequently decided by this court. The party complaining of the “abuse of privilege” by the opposing counsel should object at the time the objectionable language is used, so that the court, *531when it comes to charge the jury, may correct the error, if one was committed, and put the matter right in the minds of the jury. “A party cannot be allowed thus to speculate upon his chances for a verdict, and then complain because counsel were not arrested in their comments upon the case. Such exceptions, like those to the admission of incompetent evidence, must be made in apt .time, or else bo lost.” Knight v. Houghtalling, 85 N. C., 17; State v. Johnston, 88 N. C., 623.
There is no error. Let this bo certified to the superior court of Craven county, that the cause may be proceeded with in conformity to this opinion and the law of the state.
■ No error. Affirmed.