It is shown by the record that A. T. Waters claims the premises by a lease from month to month from the plaintiff, and that the defendant Roberts claims the bar-room under the said Waters. Taking these to be the facts of the case, it is an established principle that a tenant is estopped to deny the title of his landlord: and the rule extends to a tenant holding over, as well as to an under-tenant, assignee or other person claiming under the lease. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, §705. But it was competent for Roberts, the under-tenant, to show that his lease had not expired; and for that purpose he proposed to contradict the testimony of the plaintiff, who had testified that his lease to A. T. Waters was by the month, by showing that the lease to him from A. T. Waters was for a whole year, and that the lease of said Waters to Farrow was for a like term. The refusal of the court to admit this testimony constitutes the first two exceptions taken by the defendant, upon points of evidence.
The ruling is correct. The evidence is clearly incompetent, because irrelevant to the issue. The issue was, “ Was A. T. Waters a tenant of the plaintiff by the month?” The facts proposed to be proved v'ere collateral to the issue :• they were facts from which no reasonable inference could be drawn as to the matter in dispute: they had no connection with the issue, and were res inter alias aota.
This principle is well illustrated- by Mr. Stakkie in his work on Evidence, p. 618, by the cases there cited. For example: the time at which one tenant pays his rent is not evidence to show at what time another tenant of the same landlord, and of the same description as the former, pays his rent. Carter v. *148 Pryke, Es. & Peake Rep., 95; Furneux v. Hutchins, Camp., 807. Mor is the quality of a commodity, sold to one customer, proved by showing the quality of that sold to others. Hollingham v. Head, B. N. S., Vol. I, 387, where Wijules, J., says: “The question is whether iu an action for goods sold and delivered, it is competent to the defendant to set up, by tray of defence, that the-plaintiff has entered into contracts with third persons in a particular firm, with the view of thereby inducing the jury to come to the conclusion that the contract sued upon was not as represented by the plaintiff. I am clearly of the opinion it was-not competent to the defendant to do so.” Same principle in Bruner v. Threadgill, 88 N. C., 361; Warren v. Makely, 85 N. C., 12.
The exception to the refusal of the judge to permit the defendant’s counsel to argue the terms of the lease to Farrow, was properly overruled, for there was no evidence before the jury upon which such an argument could be predicated.
A point was made by the defendant, as to the notice to quit, in contending that it should have been given him by his immediate lessor, and not by the plaintiff, but there is no force in the objection. The notice was properly given, whether the defendant Roberts was in possession by an assignment of the lease of A. T. Waters, or by a sub-lease from him. An assignment of a lease passes the whole estate of the lessee; a lease, a less estate-than the lessor had. By an assignment, the assignee is placed in the shoes of the assignor, and a notice to him is as good as it would be to the assignor had there been no assignment. In the case of a sub-lease, the notice, as has been held, must be given by the lessor to his lessee, or by the mesne-lessee to the under-tenant. Taylor, supra, §3. So that, whichever way it may be taken, the notice to quit was good, for it was given to both A. T. Waters and Roberts.
No error. Affirmed..