There was an exception taken by the defendant to the testimony of the prosecutor, but it amounts to nothing, especially after the testimony of Starke was introduced. It was properly overruled.
*645His next exception was to the refusal of the court to instruct the.jury that there was no evidence of the falsity'of defendants representation. We concur with the ruling of His Honor upon this point, and are of the opinion that there was not only evidence of the falsity of the defendants representation, but that it was sufficient, with the proof of the other ingredients of the crime with which he was charged, to warrant the jury in returning a verdict of guilty.
It has been repeatedly decided by this court, that to constitute the crime of “falsepretence” under Bat. Rev., ch. 32, § 67, there must be a false pretence of a subsisting fact; the pretence must be knowingly false; the money, goods, or thing of value, of the person deñ 'tided, must be unlawfully obtained by means of the false pretence, and with the intent to cheat and defraud him of the same. State v. Eason, 86 N. C., 674; State v. Phifer, 65 N. C., 321; State v. Jones, 70 N. C., 75.
All of the elements of the crime, we think, are to be found in the facts of this case.
The prosecutor had one hundred and fifty sticks of ton timber in Rock Fish creek; he contracted with the defendant to raft the timber to the mouth of the creek; before any of the timber was rafted by the defendant, he falsely stated that he had rafted three clamps of the timber to the mouth of the creek, and upon that false representation he obtained nine dollars from the prosecutor. When he made the representation, he knew it was false, and it was made for the purpose of obtaining'the money from the prosecutor.
But the defendant insisted that the bill of indictment is defective, and moved in arrest of judgment upon the ground that the defendant was not alleged in the bill of indictment to have been employed by the prosecutor or ir any way connected with him; that the timber was not alleged to have belonged to the prosecutor; that the defendant represented that he had run the same from Davis’ bridge to the mouth of Rock Fish creek for the prosecutor, or under contract with him to do so; or that there *646was any obligation on the prosecutor to pay him if the work had really been done; and that the court could not see from the indictment that the representation was calculated to defraud the prosecutor.
It was not necessary that any of these facts should be averred to constitute a good bill of indictment. This bill contains all the essential elements of an indictment for a “false pretence.” Ilt sets forth the false pretence of a subsisting fact, the knowledge of the defendant, the negation, the intent to cheat, and that the money of the prosecutor was unlawfully obtained by means of the false pretence. Whether the false pretence was calculated to impose on the prosecutor and induce him to part with h'is money, or was in fact the means of obtaining his money, were questions that properly belonged to the province of the jury. Russell on Crimes, p. 622 and note on L.
The indictment, in our opinion, is sufficient, and there is no error. Let this be certified to the superior court of Cumberland county that the case may be proceeded with according to law.
No error. Affirmed.