after stating the facts. It will be seen on examining the structure of the complaint (and we advert to it to avoid misconstruction from our silence) that it imputes the utterance of the alleged defamatory words to all the defendants and to each one of them, while its statement is that, of the three who went to the plaintiff’s house in search of the missing hogs, but one of them, Oran, said anything, and the others were present but took no part in the conversation, and that only one of them, the defen-' dant, John A., was present, and’ said and did what is alleged to have taken place on the road afterwards, in the hearing of the two witnesses named.
There are thus two unconnected alleged causes of action against different persons set out in the same complaint, a method of pleading finding as little support in the present, as in the former, system of procedure.
The complaint moreover does not specify the actionable words spoken, but gives a narrative of what occurred on two separate *162occasions, consisting of expressions and acts, and undertakes to deduce therefrom an intention on the part of the one and the other defendant to charge the plaintiff with stealing the hogs.
We have in vain searched for any precedent for this form of declaration or complaint in an action for the utterance of actionable words. It is a fixed rule of pleading that the plaintiff shall set out, show a direct charge against himself of his commission of the imputed offence when the slander consists in this; or of the utterance of words, which in the light of other facts, are calculated and understood to convey such an imputation to those who may be present and hear. The language used must charge the crime directly, or have its meaning pointed by facts and circumstances which interpret its import. The complaint should be so drawn that the court, upon a demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment, can determine if a cause of action is charged, taking the facts averred to be true, and this without the aid of inferences to help them out.
In vain will we look in this complaint for any language, in either conversation, which alone, or in connection with the attending circumstances, shows that the plaintiff is charged with larceny. The conduct of the defendants, in association with what was said about the lost hogs and the trail of the wagon, indicates, at most, a suspicion that the plaintiff carried them away, but nowhere is it so charged by any one of them. Indeed a witness of the defendant present at the interview between the defendant, John A., and the plaintiff, testifying, says, that the latter declared that he did not accuse any one of taking them. We refer to this to show that the language used by him is not reasonably susceptible of a construction that amounts to a charge of larceny, and only evinces a suspicion that the plaintiff’ had taken and removed the hogs. But a suspicion lurking in the heart and manifested in one’s conduct, is not the same thing as a charge of a committed criminal act, unless perhaps, when a suspicion is expressed in a form to impute, and understood to impute, the offence to which it points. A slanderous charge, however *163disguised, may be detected in the words spoken, and will be actionable as if directly uttered. Even the words, “you are no thief” may be actionable, and are so if ironically spoken, as held in Johnson v. St. Louis, &c., 65 Mo., 529.
The words, “I have a suspicion that you and Boon have robbed my house, and therefore, I take you into custody,” were left to the jury under the charge, that if the jury found the defendant meant to impute to the plaintiff an absolute charge of felony, the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict; but if they should think that he imputed a mere suspicion of felony, the verdict should be for the defendant. The jury found for the defendant, and upon a rule the charge of Pollok, C. B., was sustained by a full court. Tozer v. Mashford, 6 Ex. (M. H. and G.), 539.
In our case the import of the language cannot, upon any reasonable interpretation, be extended to embrace an accusation of larceny, and this is manifest upon its face, and so to be declared by the court.
We sustain the ruling of His Honor upon the ground that there are no actionable words set out in either narrative, and none upon which can be impressed a meaning to i.mpute a crime in the light shed, upon the transaction described, by the attending circumstances and antecedent facts. If the plaintiff has any remedy he has misconceived it in this action. It must be declared there is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.