While it is competent for a judge in charging a jury, in his discretion as a precautionary measure to call their attention to any fact or circumstance proved on the trial, which affects the credit of a witnees, it is incumbent on him to do so, without conveying to the jury his opinion on the weight of the testimon}^ otherwise.it is error State v. Jones, 67 N. C., 285; State v. Ellington, 7 Ired., 61, (opinion p. 67).
The competency of witnesses and the relevancy of their testimony are exclusively within the province of the court: the credit of witnesses and the sufficiency of their testimoñy are as exclusively matters for the determination of the jury. This was so at common law and is made especially so under our act of 1796. Noland v. McCracken, 1 Dev. & Bat., 594.
In those cases where the judges on the trial of cases in the superior courts have undertaken as a caution to the jury to comment upon the credibility of witnesses as affected by their connection with the case, or relationship to the parties, and the exceptions to the charges have been overruled by this court, it is where the remarks of the judge have been accompanied by instructions to the jury that it was their province to determine upon the credibility of the witnesses.
In the case of the State v. Ellington, supra, where the credibility of the mother and sister, examined as witnesses for the defendant, was attacked by the state on account of their relationship, the court charged the jury that it was their *547province to determine it, and it was for them to say whether these witnesses had testified truly.
In Nash’s case, 8 Ired., 35, where the credibility of the mother of the prisoner, who was examined in his behalf, was attacked on similar grounds, the court charged that the law regarded with suspicion the testimony of near relathes when testifying for each other; that it was the province of the jury to consider and decide upon the weight of her testimony. And in the case of the State v. Nat, 6 Jones, 114, where the witnesses were fellow-servants, and the court below instructed the'jury that the relationship affected the credit of the witnesses, this court sustained his Honor, observing whether that was communicated to the jury in the one form of expression or another, it did not violate the law when they were told at the same time that they were to be judges of the extent to which the credit of the witnesses was impaired by such relationship.
In our case his Honor told the jury “ that the witness for the defendant, William Lee, is included in the same bill of indictment on a charge of larceny, and this very fact will impair his testimony, and that his testimony should not be placed on the same plane or footing with that of a witness of undoubted character who was disinterested.” It does not appear from the record that there was any explanation or qualification of these remarks. In giving them thus unqualified to the jury, we think his Honor transgressed the limits of his duty and invaded the province of the jury. We think it was a clear intimation of an opinion upon the weight of the testimony, and the jury might reasonably have drawn from the expressions of his Honor the inference that in his opinion they should give more credit to the state’s witnesses than to ¿he witness Lee.
We think his Honor overstepped his limits when he told the jury that the very fact of the witness being included in the bill of indictment impaired his testimony. It could dot neces*548sarily impair liis testimony, for if he had testified against his interest, so far from impairing his testimony, it would have strengthened it.
Holding as we do, that his Honor in his remarks to the jury intimated an opinion upon the weight of the evidence, this court will not hesitate to grant a new trial for such an irregularity. State v. Jones, supra. There is error.
Let this be certified to the criminal court of New Hanover county, that further proceedings may be had according to law.
Error, .Venire de novo.