The plaintiff in the motion is precluded, by Iiis Honor’s finding of fact, from asserting further, that the defendant sheriff sold the Stenhouse land under the Davis execution. This being so, she can derive no support for her claim to the land, from that execution, as was decided in Seawell v. Bank, 3 Dev., 279. There, it was held that if a sheriff has several writs against the same defendant and fails to sell under one of them, that one cannot be ealled in to aid the title of a purchaser, who buys at a sale under the others. The circumstances of that case were very much stronger in favor of such a right in the purchaser, than those existing in the plaintiff’s case, for there some portion of the money, raised by the sale, was applied to the omitted *333execution. .The principle which says that a sheriff, who sells under several "writs, one of which is rightful and the others indifferent, can confer upon the purchaser a valid title, has no application to the plaintiff’s claim -r for that presupposes what does not exist in her case, a sale under all. Until the contrary is shown, a sheriff, who sells, is presumed to act under every power conferred upon him and existing at the time, as was said in Huggins v. Ketchum, 4 Dev. & Bat., 414; and in such case a nais-recital or a non-recital of his powers will not be permitted to prejudice the title of the purchaser. But this presumption of a sale under all may he shown to be untrue, and unfortunately for th© plaintiff, His Honor finds it to be. untrue in her case. If the defendant sheriff did not, in fact, act under the power given him by the Davis execution, he should not be permitted, and much less required, to recite that in his deed as one under which he proceeded ; for apart from the question of untruthfulness involved, it might seriously complicate the rights of the plaintiff in that judgment.
We hold therefore that His Honor did right in denying the plaintiff’s motion, and the order of the court below is affirmed.
No error. • Affirmed.