after stating the case. There were no exceptions ¡taken on the trial btt.t those to the refusal of His Honor to give the instructions prayed, and the charge given to the •jury.
The defendant on his examination as a witness admitted that he bought at the clerk and master’s sale the land known as the Brittain land, and that was the land he sold to the plaintiff, and it is not denied that the land lay on the river, and that the beginning was where Phillip Brit-tain’s upper line crosses the river, but the dispute is as to that point. The plaintiff contends it was at a certain red oak which stands on the tank of the river which was in that line, and in.fact was a line tree in that line indicating where the line ran. The defendant insisted in his prayer for instructions, that that fact could not be proved by parol, but by some deed or other title in writing showing that Brittain'owned a tract of land that crossed the river. We do not think that was at all necessary, The land in controversy was known as the Brittain land. It must have had some boundaries, and there is no principle of law better settled than that the location of boundaries may be proved by parol or reputation. Nothing is more common in practice, when a deed calls for the corner of an adjacent tract than to prove by parol, the declarations of deceased, witnesses; for instance, where the corner stands, without showing in evidence any deed to the owner of the land. It is often matter of mere hearsay, but may be proved by other more direct means; and therefore it was perfectly competent for the plaintiff as he has done in this case, to prove by the declarations of deceased witnesses, that the red oak claimed by him as the beginning was Phillip Brittain’s upper line. As to the objection that there is no competent proof thát Phillip Brittain owned any land, the line of which crosses the river, there was proof offered without objection from, which the jury were warranted-in inferring that Brittain *415once claimed the land and that his line crossed the river, for he and one Jones who claimed the land on the other side established the river as a conditional line between them. The proof seems-to us to have conclusively established the red oak as the beginning corner of the land claimed by the plaintiff, and was perfectly competent for that purpose. See Standin v. Bains, 1 Hay., 258; Taylor v. Shuford, 4 Hawks, 116; Hartzoz v. Hubbard, 2 Dev. & Bat., 241 ; Hendrick v. Gobble, 63 N. C., 48.
We hold there was no error in refusing the instructions prayed, nor-was there any in the charge given to the jury, unless it was in the concluding sentence which reads, “that it was not always necessary to have a deed or grant or .any paper title even to show title for land, for thirty years would ripen into title without writing of any kind.” This was evidently a “slip” and any one of common intelligence would understand it to mean “thirty years possession,” but let that be as it may, we cannot say there was a fatal error in that, giving it the most unfavorable construction ; for as we hold it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce any deed or other paper title to Phillip Brittain, showing that he owned land covering that in controversy, and that one of the lines thereof crossed the river, although the charge may be against law, yet it was harmless, and it is apparent from the whole case that it could not have mislead the jury. Hice v. Woodward, 12 Ired., 293.
There is no error. The judgment of the superior court of Burke is affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.