(After stating the case.) The chai'ge in substance is, that if the intent to defraud either of the parties named was satisfactorily proved to the jury, they were warranted in finding against the defendant on the last eount under the general allegation to defraud. In this we see no error. The form of this count is authorized by the ex’press words of the statute, and it is sufficient at the trial to show any person who could be defrauded and against whom the intent to defraud is directed, in proof of the general averment of an intent to defraud. But it is neither necessary nor proper that the verdict should specify the person intended to be defrauded. The intent is often legally ascertained from the act itself, and it is quite apparent the fraud would have been consummated, had the defendant’s attempt been successful upon those whose property had been taken from them through the instrumentality and use of the forged order; and against them therefore must the fraudulent intent have been directed.
We think the exception founded upon the misdescription of the proper firm name of the persons to whom the order is directed, entirely untenable. The firm of Leak, Everett & Co., constituted of W. J. Everett and others, recognized and acted upon orders drawn by Flowers, and thus directed, and heafter-*406wards paid them. This concurrent understanding of both parties to the transaction gives legal validity to tlie form of the order.
But the indictment cannot be sustained for forgery under the statute (Bat. Rev. ch. 32, § 58) as construed by the adjudications in this state. The words “ order for the delivery of goods ” used in the enumeration of those written instruments the false making of which is in the act declared to be forgery, are held to include such orders only as are drawn by a person having a disposing power over the goods upon a person under obligation to obey. The instrument described in the indictment is rather in the nature of an application to purchase goods on credit, and the contract of sale is consummated by delivering to the boy. To- bring it within the statute, there must be averments of such disposing power in one, and corresponding duty to deliver on the other, and proof to support them. These averments are not contained in the count on which the defendant was convicted. State v. Lamb, 65 N. C., 419; State v. Thorn, 66 N. C., 644.
But the conviction may be sustained for the offence at common law, as is held in Lamb’s case? supra. There is error in the judgment below. This will be certified to the end that judgment may be rendered upon the verdict of guilty on the third count in the indictment as for an offence at common law. State v. Walker, Term. Rep., 229; State v. Upchurch, 9 Ire., 454; State v. Cook, Phil., 535.
Per Curiam. Order accordingly.