State v. Allen, 8 N.C. 6, 1 Hawks 6 (1820)

June 1820 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

8 N.C. 6, 1 Hawks 6

The State v. Miles Allen.

From Ashe.

. A witness, who hath never seen a person write, nor received letters from him, and who hath no knowledge of his hand-writing, but that derived from having received Bank Notss in the course of business, which purported to be signed by the person as the President of the Bank, and were reputed to be genuine, is incompetent to'prove his hand-writing, or to prove that a Bank Note, purporting to be signed by him, is counterfeit : at least, unless the ordinary occupation of the witness is such as to render it probable that he has received and passed large sums, so as to become a skilful judge, and unless it appear that he has actually passed them so long ago as to allow time for the return of them, if spurious.

The modes of proving hand-writing are, by the evidence of those,

1. Who have seen the person write, which is most certain ;

2. Who, in the course of correspondence, have received pertinent answers, or other letters of such a nature, as renders it highly probable that they were written by the person;

3. Who have inspected and become acquainted witli ancient authentic documents, which bear the signature of the person.

Adjudged cases have not yet laid down other rules,; though new cases may arise that will come within the reason of these.

And hence it seems, that a witness, having- no knowledge of the handwriting of a person but that derived from the signatures to the Bank Notes, who is a Banker, and, in that character, has habitually, for several,years, received and paid away large sums in such notes, which he believed to be genuine, and were so reputed, is competent to prove that a note, purporting to be a Bank Note, and to be signed by the same person, was not signed by him, and is counterfeit.

"^Although, sufficient leg-al evidence be before the Jury to justify the verdict, yet if improper testimony be admitted, after objection, a new trial will be ordered; because it cannot be known on which the Jury relied.

The prisoner was indicted in the Superior Court of Ashe, for a deceit in fraudulently passing a false and coisnieribit Bank Note, purporting* to be issued by the Bank of Augusta, in Georgia, and to be signed by Thomas Gumming, as President, and E. Early, as Cashier, of that Bank. Several witnesses were called by the Solicitor, on the trial, to prove that the note was counterfeit. None of them had seen Cumming or Early write, or had received letters from them $ but they all swore, that in the usual course of their business, they had received considerable sums of money in notes of the Bank of Augusta, which had the names of Camming and Early signed to them as President and Cashier; that the notes thus received by them were reputed to be genuine, and passed currently as such; that in this way, and this only, they had acquired a knowledge of the hand-writing of Camming and Early ; and, if the notes received by them were genuine, that-which was then before the Court was counterfeit. Another witness, A. Erwin, proved that he often received, and liad seen received in the State Bank at Morganton, large sums in the notes of the Bank of Augusta, which had been paid out again by the Bank in the course of-business at various times for several years; that the notes thus received were reputed to be good, and that he believed them to he so 5 and if they were genuine, the note in question was undoubtedly counterfeit, in his opinion. It was objected, on behalf of the prisoner, that such evidence ought not to go to the J ury, because none of the witnesses had become acquainted with the hand-writing of Gumming or Early, by either seeing them write, or in the course of correspondence.' But the Court suffered tiic evidence to go to the Jury, and instructed them, that, if they believed the witnesses, they were authorised upon that evidence to consider the note as counterfeit. The Jury found the prisoner guilty; and he moved for a new trial for misdirection, which was refused, and sentence passed on himj from which he appealed to this Court.

The case was argued by the Attorney-General, for the State, and by Seawell, for the prisoner.

Tayior, Chief-Justice.

The only methods of proving the hand-writing of a person, sanctioned by law, are,

First, By a witness who saw him sign the very paper in dispute 5

Secondly, By one who has -seen him write, and has thereby fixed a standard In his own miml, by which, he ascertains the genuineness of any other v/idliug imputed to him;

Thirdly, By a witness who has received letters from the supposed writer, of such a nature os rmsdcru it probable that they were written by the person from whom they purport to come. Such evidence is only admissible where there is good reason to believe dial the letters, from which the witness has derived his knowledge, were really written by the supposed writer of the paper in question ;

Fourthly, When a witness has become acquainted with his manner of signing his name, by inspecting other ancient writings bearing the same signature, and which have been regarded and preserved as authentic .documents. This inode of proof is conNied to ancient writings, and is admitted as being the best tire nature of the case will allow.

Other modes of proving hand-writs us;, not yet sanctioned by adjudged cases, may possibly come within the reason of the cases enumerated; but I think they ought to appear clearly to do so, before they ave admitted. The Court ought to be well satisfied that the person who provea the signatures on a Bank Bill, without having seen the signers write, or having been engaged in a correspondence with them, were, from their* situation and pursuits, likely to acquire a correct knowledge on the subject; and, particularly, that they nrust have known of the return of those, bills they believed to be genuine, if they had been .spurious. The first witnesses in this case only knew that they had received bills in the course of business which purported to be signed by the President and Cashier1 of the Augusta Bank; that they passed them away, and if they were genuine, the note in question was counterfeit. What wars the occupation of the witnesses, whether they were likely to receive many bills, and to acquire an accurate knowledge of the signatures, are facts to which no evidence is directed. They may have received counterfeit bills, which may yet return; for it is not said when they received and passed them away. Such evidence, I think, inadmissible; especially as it requires much experience and a more than ordinary skill to detect counterfeit signatures to Bank Notes. The fraudulent ingenuity of men has brought this crime to such perfection, that even the signers themselves have sometimes been imposed upon. Hence, before witnesses are allowed to give evidence to the Jury, the Court ought to be satisfied that they are skilled in the knowledge of Bank Notes. The evidence of Envin approaches very nearly to my conceptions of what is proper on sucli a question; and if I were certain that the verdict was founded on his evidence, and not on that of the other witnesses, I should hesitate, in agreeing to a new trial. But, as some improper testimony has been admitted, a new-trial must be awarded.

HeNdersoN, Judge.

The Law requires, that be who deposes to a fact, should have the means of knowing it. Grounds of conjecture and opinions are not sufficient. A knowledge, therefore, of the hand-writing of a person, should be founded on specimens of writing known to be his. Having seen him write, is the most certain. But it is said to satisfy the rule, if the specimens be obtained in the course of a correspondence in which pertinent answers have been received, or if they be ancient authentic documents. I am not disposed to go further : for there is nothing more dangerous than a relaxation of the rules of evidence. Their object is more to prevent imposition by falsehood, than even to get at the truth — my meaning is, that tiie Law prefers that many truths should be omitted, ■than that one falsehood should he imposed on tire Court. The rules, therefore, guard more against ihe introduction of falsehood, than against the suppression of the truth. In this case, it is more than probable, that the Bank Notes which the witnesses Sind seen, and from which they had drawn their knowledge of the hand-writing of the President and Cashier of tiie Bank were genuine, and, therefore, that the note passed by the prisoner was counterfeit. But this rests on bare probabilities $ for it might well have happened, that most or all of the notes from which they derived their knowledge, were spurious. Wo cautiously" refrain from giving any opinion upon the doctrines laid down in the case, of The United States v. Haltsclaw.^* It does not appear here, what the ordinary business of the witnesses was; how or when they received the notes ; at what time they liad passed., them ; or whether they had passed them at all, so as, if spurious, they might be returned upon them. All that those witnesses said, may, therefore, well be true, and yet the note in question be genuine. It is certainly better, that the prosecutor should be put to the trouble of procuring better testimony, than that a man should be punished in a case where it is quite possible he may be innocent. Many of these observations do not apply to Mr. Erwin: certainly he had a belter opportunity of forming a correct judgment, than any of the other witnesses. But even if he was admissible, a new trial should be granted ,• because wc cannot say on whose testimony the jury relied.

Let there be a new trial.

Hath., Judge, concurred.

* 2 Hayw. 379.