I am of opinion that the law was correctly laid down by the presiding Judge, in his charge to the Jury : for, however much we may now regret that the act of 1784 was not construed as a statute of frauds, avoiding all parol gifts of slaves, as well between the' parties, as where, creditors and purchasers were concerned, it is now too firmly settled by a uniform train of decisions to be even questioned, that as between the parties* and volunteers under them, the transfer is good, and that it is void only where creditors and purchasers are cjp;erned ; nor can we adopt the expedient pressed upogpis from the bar, that we would in this casé give to tbiract what we consider to be its true construction, as there has been no decision that’a fraudulent or coloura-ble purchaser was not within the prohibition of the act. This would, to our understanding, be something like a subterfuge; the protection of the act is afforded to a purchaser on account of his merits — not his demerits; we cannot perceive the situation of a fraudulent and co-lourable purchaser to be better than that of the person from whom he purchased. Can title be strengthened by adding a fraudulent link to the chain ? it appears to me that if either is to be preferred, it is the original party ; if Strudrviel' -therefore was a fraudulent or coloura-ble purchaser, (and this fact was properly left to the Jury) he and his voluntary representatives stand in the situation of the husband Hargrove, from whom he purchas - ed, and as the parol gift, if made, was binding upon Hargrove, it is binding on the Defendant Jlshe, who is a volunteer under Strudwick. The Judge was also correct in informing the Jury, that a possession, to be aided by the statute of limitations, must be adverse; he was correct also in stating, that three years adverse possession since the act of 1806, did hot give a title, but only *341barred the remedy—Skinner v. Skinner, (2 Murp. Rep. 535,) and as the case of Skinner v. Skinner is mentioned, I take the opportunity of retracting an erroneous dictum which fell from me in that case. I there stated, that three years adverse possession woufd protect a Plaintiff in the action of replevin, because the Defendant became the actor in the suit: in this I was wrong. The adverse possession for three years in the Plaintiff barred the Defendant’s action, not his right, and when he in the action of replevin justified his taking under his title, it was no answer to say, that his action was barred, for the justification rested on his title, and not on his right of action : this dictum did not affect the case of Skinner v. Skinner, nor does it the present one.
By the Court. — In this case the rule for a new trial must be discharged, and judgment entered for the'Plaintiff.