The objection in this case is to the sufficiency of the description of the property in the bill of indictment, to wit, “ one pound of meat of the value of five-cents.” We find no direct authority in our Reports nor in the text books. In State v. Morey, 2 Wis. 362, the same *656question was presenter], and the Court held that “ in an indictment for larceny, the property which is alleged to have been stolen should be described with reasonable certainty; and a charge of stealing meat which applies not only to the flesh of all animals, used for food, but in a general sense, to all kinds of provisions, is too vague and uncertain.” In this conclusion we concur. Such articles have more specific names in commerce and in the country, which ought to be employed in criminal proceedings.
We cite the following cases merely as a reference to the several phases in which the question of description of stolen property has been considered': State v. Brown, 1 Dev. 137; State v. Godet, 7 Ire. 210; State v. Clark, 8 Ire. 226; State v. Horan, Phil. 571; State v. Campbell, 76 N. C. 261; State v. Krider, 78 N. C. 481.
In State v. Jenkins, 78 N. C. 478, the word meat is used in the syllabus and report, of the case. It should have been bacon, as appears from the original papers on file, and we refer to it to avoid misconception, the point there decided being different from the one in our case. Let this be certified to the end that judgment be arrested.
Error. Judgment arrested.