The plaintiff was allowed by the Judge to prosecute her action > n forma pmtp<-n , upon her presenting to him a certificate of two counsel to the effect that they had examined her case, and -were of opinion that she had a good cause of action, and her affidavit of her poverty. The affidavit purported to have been sworn to before the clerk of the Chancery Court of Hinds county, Mississippi, and was authenticated by what purported to be the seal of that court. The defendant contends that the Judge exceeded his powers, because the statute, Bat. Rev. chap. 17, sec. 72, (Act of 1868-’69, chap. 96,) was not complied with.
That statute is in these words: “Any Judge, Justice of the Peace, or Clerk of the Superior Court, may authorize any person to sue as a pauper in their respective courts, when he shall prove by one or more witnesses that he has a good cause of action, and shall make affidavit that he is unable to comply with the provisions of the last section,” which requires a bond, with security, or a deposit of money with the Clerk.
The defendant contends:
1. That it appears that no witnesses were examined by the. Judge.
2. That the affidavit was not sufficiently authenticated.
As to the first point: The Code of Civil Procedure, section 72, provided that a Judge might allow any person to sue as a. pauper upon a certificate from any attorney that in his opinion such person had a good cause of action, and upon his state-, ment that he would prosecute the demand without fee. This last requisition was an inconvenient impediment to the bring-. *34ing of pauper actions. From its having been omitted, we maj suppose that one, if not the main object of the Act amending the Code, was to get rid of this restriction, which was obnoxious to members of the bar. The intention then was to facilitate pauper actions. A literal construction of the Act would make them almost impossible, and would moreover lead to absurdities which we cannot, without disrespect to the Legislature, suppose that they intended. The pauper is required to prove before the Judge his right to recover, by witnesses: that is, by persons who personally know the facts, and whose evidence would be sufficient on a trial to make out a prima facie case. Yet he cannot compel the attendance of his witnesses for this purpose by process, and by the hypothesis that he is a pauper, he cannot ■ procure their attendance by paying their expenses. Nor is any provision made for taking their depositions if they be sick or non-residents. In addition to this, the Judge who should try a case wholly without prejudice and without having received a bias from any one-sided statement, is required to hear the plaintiff’s version of the facts, and to express an opinion that ‘prima facie he is entitled to recover. For a Judge to permit himself to be “talked to” privately by parties or their attorneys about a case pending before him, is indecent, and perhaps criminal. The Legislature never could have intended this, and we are compelled to conclude that it never intended any thing more than that the Judge should be satisfied by a certificate of counsel or otherwise that the plaintiff had an honest cause of action, on which he might reasonably expect to recover. No doubt this is substantially the law of every State of the Union, and we cannot believe that the Legislature intended to alter a practice sanctioned by convenience and by long and universal usage.
As to the second objection: "We think that the affidavit was not legally authenticated so as to authorize the Judge to act on it. There was required, in addition,'a testimonial from the Judge of the Court that the person professing to be Clerk *35of tbe Chancery Court was such .officer and that he had authority to administer oaths. Bat. Rev., chap. 43, sec. 9.
The Judge below need not necessarily dismiss the plaintiff’s-action by reason of this informality in the authentication of her affidavit. He may, if he shall think proper, continue the cause until she has a reasonable time to supply the defect, cither by procuring the testimonial of the Judge or by swearing to her affidavit before a Commissioner for this State in Mississippi, which latter may be the more prudent course.
The order allowing the plaintiff to sue as a pauper is reversedj and the- case is remanded to be proceeded in according to law. Neither party will recover costs in this court.-
Let this opinion be certified.