The counsel for the plaintiffs suggests that if the court can find in the books no principle sufficiently large to give relief in cases like this, they ought to invent one to meet the new order of things necessarily arising upon the abolition of slavery and the establishment of freedom. I confess that I should feel much inclined to do, rather than burden the consciences of the defendants with a decree in their favor. But fortunately for their repose, we need not invent a new principle in order to induce the defendants to do equity. So far as this litigation is concerned, we may treat the defendants'as plaintiffs seeking the active intervention of the court *299to enable them, not to hold, but to recover possession of land by virtue of a deed which his Honor finds was made in fraud of the law.
His Honor also finds that neither Jones Watson, the trustee, nor James Y- Watson, the master, nor his children, the plaintiffs, ever paid any part of the purchase money, but that the same was paid by November Caldwell, who occupied the said-lot from the date of his purchase in 1858, to the day of his. death in 1872, and paid the taxes on the same and built improvements thereon; and that he devised the same to his wife and grand children, who now have possession of the premises.. So in order to support the decree which his Honor felt bound: to render, we must give force to a deed made in fraud of the law, when equity would at least say to the parties, we leave you as we find you ; the devisees of November Caldwell in. possession, and the aid of the court to eject them therefrom, will not be granted.
But we must not stop here. Putting aside the fraudulent: deed as something which the court will not enforce in aid of-either party, it appears that Green Caudle, the grantor in the deed, on the 23d day of March, 1869, after November Caldwell had become a free man, executed another deed untainted with fraud in law or fact, and in pursuance of the original intention of all the parties, whereby he conveyed the same lot to November Caldwell in fee simple. So that November Caldwell having acquired his freedom, and being, relieved of the disability which enforced his participation in the fraudulent transaction, acquires a deed in fee simple, to* land for which he had paid the full purchase money to the-, vendor.
And now his devisees only ask the aid of the court to remove from their title, under the deed of 1869 a cloud darkened by fraud, and bearing upon the plaintiffs in a manner revolting to good conscience. Why cannot this be done without resort to-a new principle ? But further, no one can believe for a. *300'.moment, that when November Caldwell, a slave, purchased Ms quasi freedom, and then purchased half an acre of land and paid for both with his own money, that either he or any •of those with whom he was dealing, did not intend by the by the first deed to create a trust for his benefit, and that the limitation over to his master’s children was also intended to be upon the same trust, from which they were to derive no beneficial interest. "Will they at tliis day, be heard to say ought to the contrary ?
Whatever may have been the result, had the trustee or the masters children, in violation of all faith, taken the property 'to their own use, wliile November was a slave, and when such conveyances were against the policy of the law, yet as no such claim was asserted until that policy had ceased, and the Contention of 1868 had ordained, “ that whenever it shall judicially appear that any person, while held as a slave, purchased and paid for any property, personal or real, and that convey-•■an.ee thereof was made to him, or to any one for his use. such purchaser, or those lawfully representing him, shall be entitled to such pi’operty, anything in the former laws of the State forbidding slaves to acquire or hold property to the contrary, notwithstanding,” it is clear that the courts will not now -give countenance to such an iniquitous claim. Nor shall they permit the plaintiffs to be harassed thereby. In support of 'this view, we may cite the act of 1869-’70, chap. 57, to show that the Legislature has -adopted the policy indicated by the Convention of 1868, a policy in fact, whicli necessarily sprang Into existence, full grown and vigorous, upon the abolition of isla very.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.
Let.a decree be drawn in conformity with the prayer of the complaint. Lattimore v. Dixon, 63 N. C., 356.
.Per Curiam. Judgment reversed.