This action was brought before a Justice of the Peace, and came to the Superior Court by appeal. No record of the pleadings before the Justice is sent up. It was tried de novo in the Superior Court, without any ¡^leadings being filed there, and we can only infer the matters in issue, from the case/on the appeal from that Court to this.
From this, and especially from the instructions of the Judge, it appeal’s that the plaintiff claimed,
1st. For a breach of the defendant’s promise to pay the amount of Jones’ draft on him, if plaintiff would wait fifteen days, which promise was alleged to have been made to Williamson, an agent of the plaintiffs.
2d. For breach of a promise to pay, alleged to have been afterwards made to plaintiffs personally at Rock Hill, in South Carolina, which promise the jury negatived.
We do not feel at liberty to consider any question except *425that made by the plaintiff’s exception to the Judge’s charge. The Judge assumed that there was evidence which would have made the offer of the defendant binding, in case it had been immediately accepted. The case does not profess to set out all the evidence, and the only point discussed before us has been whether the omission by the agent then and there to accept the offer, authorized the defendant to treat it as a nullity under the circumstances. This, therefore, is the only point to which our consideration has been directed.
The plaintiffs resided at Bock Hill, South Carolina. Having a draft drawn by Jones on defendant, they sent it to Williams, as their agent to present it to defendant for payment at Charlotte. Williams, immediately on receiving the draft, presented it to defendant, who promised to pay it if Williams would wait fifteen days. Williams replied that he had no authority to do that, but would write to plaintiffs. He at once wrote to plaintiffs to that effect, and received a reply authorizing him to give the indulgence, of which he informed defendant, who said he would write to plaintiffs himself.
The Judge told the jury, in effect, that the promise to Williams was not binding, as it was not accepted for the plaintiff then and there.
Iu this we think his Honor erred.
A collection, and able discussion of the principal cases upon the making of contracts by correspondence, or by messengers, which are the same things, may be found in the second edition of Benjamin on Sales, 38, 51.
The cases most worthy of attention are Adams v. Linsdell, 1 B. & Ald., 681; Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. of L. Cas., 381, Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend., (N. Y.) 104; Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Insurance Company, 9 How., 390.
The law, as applicable to the facts of the present case, is this: When the defendant, on being presented by the agent of the plaintiffs with the draft from Jones, offered to pay it if the plaintiffs would wait fifteen days, the offer was a continuing *426one for sncb reasonable time as would enable the agent to communicate it to bis principal and receive his reply.
This reply was an acceptance of the offer, which was made and sent to the agent in a reasonable time, and communicated by him to the defendant. We think that after the acceptance of the offer by the plaintiff, the bargain was closed, and that defendant could not retract; or at all events, this was so, after the acceptance was made known to the defendant. At which of these dates it become closed, is not material in the present case.
Pee CuRiAM. Venire de novo.