The plaintiff, who is- a merchant, furnished to the feme defendant certain articles, just previous to her marriage, consisting of a chamber set and other articles, constituting her bridal outfit, amounting in all to the value of one hundred and four dollars and twenty-five cents. It is conceded that the chamber set is still in the possession and use of the defendants.
To the plea of infancy, the plaintiff replies, necessaries.
The evidence in regard to the estate and degree of the feme defendant is set forth in the record.
His Honor charged, that if the jury believed the articles furnished were actually necessary, and of a reasonable price, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The record simply states that the defendant excepted. But we see no objection to this charge.
In Smith v. Young, 2 Dev. & Bat., 26, Daniel, J., states the rule governing such cases wifh great clearness. He says : “The question whether necessaries or not, is a.mixed question of law and fact, and as such should be submitted by the Judge to the jury, together with his directions upon the law; whether articles furnished to an infant are of the classes for which he-is liable, is matter of law; whether they were actually necessary and of reasonable price, is matter of fact for the jury/7'
In addition to the authorities cited by the learned Judge, in, support of this proposition, we would add the recent case of Ryder v. Wombwell, decided in the Court of Exchequer, and reported in Law Eeports of 1868-9, page 31.
His Honor is to be understood as holding the articles fur*114nished to be of the class for which the defendant would be liable, and it appears from the record that there was evidence, which was well left to the jury, and from which they might have properly found that the articles were necessary to one in the degree and condition of the defendant, and that they were of reasonable price. There is an exception to the general rule, that an infant is incapable of binding himself by a contract made, not in favor of tradesmen, but for the benefit of the infant himself, in order that he may obtain necessaries on a credit. As is -veil said in Hyman v. Cam, 3 Jones, 111, “infants had better be held liable to pay for necessary food, clothing, &e., than for the want of credit, to be left to starve.”
Nor are we to understand by the word necessaries, only such articles as are absolutely necessary to support life, but it includes also such articles as are suitable to the state, station and degree dn life of the person to whom they are furnished. Peters v. Pleming, 6 M. & W., 46.
Although the point is not distinctly made, upon the record, yet it would seem that the defendant relies somewhat upon the Idea that her mother was bound to support her, notwithstanding the fact that she had some estate of her own. The obligation of the mother is not the same as that of the father to support infant children, and the weight of authority, both in this country and in England, is against the liability of the mother to this burden, except under peculiar circumstances. 1 Parsons on Con., 5th ed., p. 308.
Let it be certified that there is no error.
Per C.URiAM. Judgment affirmed.