Stewart v. Davis, 7 N.C. 244, 3 Mur. 244 (1819)

May 1819 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

7 N.C. 244, 3 Mur. 244

Charles Stewart v Thomas H. Davis.

h From Craven. J

The Plaintiff occupied a lot in the town of Newbern, as lessee of the Trastees of the Newbern Academy, and the Defendant being Sheriff of Craven County, seized the Plaintiff's goods by distress for a tax alleged to be due upon part of the lot. The lot was granted for the use of the Academy before the revolution. It does not adjoin the lot on which the Academy is erected. — This lot is not exempted from taxes by the act of 1806, ch. 3, which declares that “ all houses and “ lots, or other real or personal estate appertaining thereto, set apart “ and appropriated to divine worship, or for the education of youth, “ shall be exempted from all taxes.” Por

It was the design of this act to exempt from taxes only that property which was specially and exclusively set apart and appropriated ti> divine worship and education, and directly employed for either of these purposes : as the lot on which the Church or Academy stands and the grounds appurtenant, if employed as a church-yard, minister’s residence, or for the recreation or nourishment of youth.

This was an action of trespass for taking away the Plaintiff’s goods. The Defendant being Sheriff of the County of Craven, seized the said goods by distress, for a tax alleged to be due upon part of a lot in the town of Newborn, occupied by the Plaintiff as lessee of tbe Trustees of tbe Newbern Academy. Tbe Trustees of tbe New-bern Academy are a corporation created by law for the education of youth, and tbe lot in question is part of funds granted to the said corporation before tbe revolution, to enable tbe same more effectually to answer tbe ends of its institution. Tbe lot does not adjoin that on which tbe Academy itself is erected. It was agreed, that if tbe Court should be of opinion that tbe premises in occupation of tiie Plaintiff, were liable to taxation, judgment should be rendered for the Defendant $ if otherwise, then for tbe Plaintiff, with six-pence damages and costs. — The case was ordered to be sent to this Court; and

Tayxoij, Chief-Justice,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is contended by the Plaintiff that the lot which he occupies as lessee of the Trustees of the Newborn Academy, is exempted from taxation by the words of the act of 1806, ch. 3. The tenth section of the act is in these words ; ee all houses and lots or other real or personal estate ap- “ pertaining thereto, set apart and appropriated to divine i( worship, or for the educationo f youth, shall be, and the “ same are hereby exempted from all taxes whatsoever.” It was the design of this law to exempt from taxes only that property, which was specially and exclusively set apart and appropriated to divine worship or education, and directly employed for either of these purposes ,* as the lot on which a'church stands, which would include the church-yard, and the minister’s residence, if the latter be an appurtenance to the principal lot 5 or an Academy and the lot on which it is built, and the grounds appurtenant to it, if employed in the purposes of education, as for the residence of the teachers, or towards the recreation or nourishment of the youth. If the Academy lot and its appurtenances were sold, whatever would pass under the name of an appurtenance, comes within the fair scope of its exemption. But a corporation may own,- and in point of fact, some do own, real property, which- is rented out for sums more than sufficient to meet any demands arising from the objects of their incorporation1; and if the Legislature intended to exempt all the property of a corporation from taxation, they would probably have used words of larger compass than those contained in this law. It is most clear, that if the trustees were to grant the Academy lot, the lot occupied by the Plaintiff would not pass with it 5 because it does not appertain to the lot which is set apart and appropriated for the education of youth. — The Defendant is entitled to judgment.