1st. As the plaintiff has stricken from his complaint his prayer for the sale of the land under the trust, we think there is no necessity for making the cestui que trusts parties to the action. Calvert on Parties in Eq. 213, citing Wakeman v. Rutland 8, Bro. P. C. 145, Saville v. Tancred 3, Swans. 141, and Hyde v. White 5, Sim. 524.
2d. By sections224, 225, ot C. O. P., the Judge may himself decide the issues of fact made in a case like this. He may also submit to a jury issues so framed as to present any questions of fact on which he doubts, arising out of the pleadings. But this is for his information only, or, as it is said, to enlighten his conscience. lie is not bound by the verdict, but may nevertheless proceed to find the questions submitted to the jury otherwise than they have done, and to find facts not included in the issues submitted to them. lie may of course adopt the findings of the jury, but upon the facts which he finds he is to pronounce his judgment. Whether he adopts or sots aside the findings ot the jury, he is required to find the facts upon which he gives his judgment, and to state his conclusions of law and fact separately.
This is the idea upon which his Honor seems to have acted in this case; for in his judgment he declares the facts which he finds, adopting the findings of the jury as his own, and states his conclusions of law on the facts so found.
In this view of the case, any defectiveness or want of completeness in the issues, or in the findings of the jury, becomes immaterial, provided, it is supplied by the findings of the Judge, to which those of the jury are fragmentary and ancillary.
Two questions therefore arise, in everyjjcase of this sort.
1st. Hoes the evidence sustain the findings ol fact by the .Judge?
2d. Assuming the facts to be as found, do they support his conclusion of law as set forth in his decree?
As to the first, we think that all that the Judge finds as facts are established by the evidence, taken in connection with *410the admissions in the pleadings. No one of them that is material seems to be really disputed. It is indeed alleged, that Blackmer & McCorkle took the drafts of James C. Turner on Swepson, in payment and satisfaction of his indebtedness to the cestui que trusts of the plaintiff. But it is clear ¡¡upon the evidence, that if they did so, they exceeded their authority, which was special, and was known to be’'so to James C. Turner. It can never be held that an authority to accept, in payment, cash in New York or Baltimore funds will extend to accepting in payment the bill of the insolvent debtor, no matter upon whom it may be drawn : for the credit of a bill is not enhanced by the credit of the drawee until acceptance.
We come then to the second question.
The Judge finds, in substance, that the delivery of the deed, from the plaintiff to J. Calder Turner, was procured by the misrepresentations of James C. Turner to the agents of the plaintiff, and was in excess of their authority. As between the plaintiff and James C. Turner, it can scarcely be denied, that upon this the plaintff would be entitled to a re-delivery or cancellation of the deed, on returning to him his protested bills, and crediting the debts with the $2,000 paid.
But J. Calder Turner contends that he purchased the land from James C. Turner, and paid him for it $2,000, which was the $2,000 paid by him to Blackmer & McCorkle, the agents of the plaintiff; that he had no notice of the representations of James C. Turner to Blackmer & McCorkle, which are ..the foundation of the plaintiff’s demand ; and that he is therefore a purchaser for value and without notice, and entitled to protection as such.
The question arising out ot this defence was submitted to the jury by the 4th issue, which embraced all the matters necessary to its determination. But the jury do not respond to the issue: they only find that J. Calder Turner did not give full value for the land.
*411This is manifestly defective. Neither does the Judge supply the defect by finding on the omitted points, lie merely adopts the finding of the jury.
Perhaps in some cases it would be convenient for the Judge to set forth, among the facts which he finds as the foundation of his judgment, not only those which being disputed must necessarily be found, but also those which are admitted by the pleadings, if these last be necessary to support his judgment. But we do not think it necessary for him to do so. The pleadings being a part of the record may always he referred to, for the ascertainment of the facts constituting the case, and we think it is proper to refer to them for the purpose of supplying, by the allegations and admissions contained in them, anything which may appear wanting in the finding or declaration of facts by the Judge. We can see no reason compelling a Judge to find upon facts not put in issue. Merely, that his doing so would present the mass of facts in a more intelligible and convenient compass, cannot make it imperative.
It becomes necessary therefore to examine the answer of J. Calder Turner, to see whether he alleges facts which amount to the defence contended for, and pleaded in Art. Y of his answer. Though not evidence for the defendant, he is bound by it, and the plaintiff may take it as true.
In Article 3, he says he purchased the land in (jnestmn from James O. Turner, and paid him @2,000. The probability is, that this sum was paid witli the expectation that it would be applied, as in fact it was, to the reduction of the incumbrances on the property, and, it may he, with the further expectation that James would extinguish the residue of the incumbrance; but this is not stated.
It is material that J. Calder Turner does not state when he purchased. If it was before the deed in trust to plaintiff, of course, it would be a clear defence. For this reason, and because all uncertain and defective statements in pleadings are *412to be taken most strongly against the pleader, we conclude his purchase was afterward, and with at least constructive notice. He purchased then an equity only (for J ames had nothing more), for which he paid value. But it is clear that a purchaser, in the meaning of the rule we are considering, must be a purchaser of the legal estate. The proposition of the defence must be, that he acquired the legal estate from the plaintiff. Can he be considered as having paid value for that? Can the payment of value to James O. Turner for his equitable interest be connected with and attached to the conveyance to J. Calder Turner of the legal title, so as to bring him within the rule? It does not appear that Blaekmer & McOorkle had notice that the $2,000 paid, to them by James was paid by him as the agent of Calder, or that it was in any way obtained from him. If, by the transaction between the two Turners, the money became the property of James, then the payment by him was on his own account and in reduction of his debt, of which Calder, as purchaser of the equity of redemption, will have the benefit, but of which he cannot claim the benefit otherwise, or as a value paid by him for the legal estate. If James paid the money and received the deed as the agent of Calder, (for the actual handing over of the deed by Blaekmer & McCorkle was to James and not to Calder,) then on the principle that notice to the agent is notice to the'principal, Calder must be taken to have had notice of the whole consideration, including the representations on .which the delivery of the deed was obtained.
It follows, that neither by the purchase of the equity of redemption for value, nor of the legal title without value, can J. Calder Turner be held a purchaser for value and without notice, in the sense of the rule.
Decree; that J. Calder Turner deliver up to plaintiff the deed made to him by plaintiff, and convey to plaintiff the land described in the deed, without prejudice to his right to the *413equity of redemption, after the payment of the residue now unpaid of the debts secured in the trust deed to plaintiff, and that that the bills of James Q. Turner on Swepson be dc'ivered up to said James.
Per Curiam. Judgment accordingly.