State v. Lowhorne, 66 N.C. 638 (1872)

Jan. 1872 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

66 N.C. 638

STATE vs. JOEL LOWHORNE.

3. The admissions of guiil of one who had, prior to making such admissions, been induced by fear or the hope ot benefit, to confess himself guilty of a criminal charge, cannot he used against him, unless it be shown by the most irrefragiblo evidence, that the motives which induced the first confession had ceased to operate.

■2 Hence, when a party had been pursuaded to make a confession of guilt, through a promise oflmmunity from prosecution therefor; Held, that in tins absence of clear proof that such inducement had ceased to operate, his confessions touching the same offence, thereafter made, were inadmissible.

The cases of State v. ¡Roberts, 1 Dev. 259, and State v. Ramson, Phil. L., 47 cited and approved.

This was an indictment for robbery, tried before His Honor .Judge Watts, at Fall Term, 1811, of the Superior Court of Johnston county.

On the trial the State proposed to introduce in evidence thq confessions of the prisoner made during Fall Term, 1810, to one Porter.

The defendant objected and offered to show that previously to that time tbe prisoner bad been induced to make confessions in consequence of a promise to him not to be prosecuted for ■the offence, if he did.

His Honor being pf opinion that, assuming such to be the. case, it would not have the legal effect to exclude the evidence of subsequent confessions, admitted the evidence proposed by the-State.

The defendant excepted. There was a verdict of guilty, and, after sentence, the prisoner appealed.

The Attorney General for the State.

Busbee & Busbee for the prisoner.

BoydKN, J.

In this case the only question for our decision is as to the adrnissability of the confessions of the defendant.

The case as made is somewhat obscure]}’stated ; but we take ii that the defendant had first been induced to confess under the confident belief that if ho did confess lie’ would not be prosecuted. And this being so, the question is, whether a subsequent statement of the facts of the case, made secretly to the witness was admissible. There being no evidence to show that the same motives that induced the defendant to make tlip first statement, were not still the operative motives to the subsequent statement. In the case of State v. Roberts, 1 Dev., 259, Henderson, Judge, says, “confessions induced by hope, or extorted by fear, are, of all kinds of, evidence the least to be relied on, and are, therefore, entirely to be rejected.” It seems to be admitted in this case, that the confessions just made, were of that character and wore therefore rejected; but that being repeated to the same person some-time afterwards, they lost their original character, assumed that of free and voluntary ones, and became evidence of the truth. How or whence does it appear that the motives which induced the first confession, had ceased to operate when it was repeated ; it is not incumbent upon the prisoner to show that they resulted from the ■-same motives. It is presumed that they did ; and evidence of the most irrefragable kind should he produced to show that they did not. It is sufficient that they may proceed from the same cause. See State v. Lawson, Phil. Rep., 47.

So, in our case, if we have properly understood it, the first confessions were made with the expectation that if he made a candid disclosure, he could not be prosecuted, and there is nothing to show that the motives which induced the first statement did not still continue. It is true, that in the case of the State v. Roberts, the confession was made to the same person, but that, we think, can make do difference.

There is error.

PER CueiAM. Venire de novo.