The sale made by the Sheriff in September,. 1867, only transferred to the purchaser such interest and estate in the land as the debtor had at the time of the levy of the original fi. fa.
The levy of they?, fa in 1861, created a lien in favor of the plaintiff in the execution, and gave the Sheriff authority to sell the land levied on.
The subsequent vend, expos, only continued the lien, and the authority which the Sheriff had acquired under the. *172original fi. fa. The lien was not a title, but only a charge upon the land, and the debtor had the right to sell the same, and the deed in trust made in 1866, to the plaintiff in this case, conveyed title subject to the subsisting lien. The crops .growing upon the land in 1867 were not embraced in said levy, and did not pass by the sale made under the vend, expos., founded upon such levy, but remained the property of the plaintiff who was the owner of the land at the time of the sale. Annual crops which are regarded in law as fructus industriales, do not necessarily pass with the title of the land. Eor many purposes they are considered as personal property and may be sold and transferred by parol, as they are not embraced in the statute of frauds. While they are growing they pass by presumption of law with the title of the land, but this presumption may be rebutted, even with parol evidence. In the case before us the legal presumption is fully rebutted, for they were not included in the levy of 1861, and of course did not pass by the sale under which the ■defendant, Hollo well, claims the land.
We will not further consider the principles involved in this case, as they are elaborately discussed in Bittinger v. Baker, 29 Penn. R. 66; Badham v. Cox, 11 Ird. 456; Brittain v. McKay, 1 Ird. 265; Flynt v. Conrad, Phil. 190.
There was no error in the charge of his Honor, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.