Money lent for tbe purpose of equipping soldiers for tbe Confederate army, cannot be recovered in tbe Courts of the rightful government: Smiiherman v. Sanders, at this term. In our case tbe money was loaned by tbe plaintiff to tbe principal obligor, with a fab knowledge that it was to be used for tbe purpose of sending a substitute to tbe Confederate army. If this object was illegal, then tbe plaintiff cannot recover.
The Confederate army was sustaining a rebellion against tbe rightful government, and it must necessarily follow tbat any act done voluntarily, and with a knowledge tbat it would have tbe effect of adding to tbe strength and efficiency of tbat army, was illegal. It was insisted in tbe argument, tbat tbe act of putting in one man as a substitute for another, did not add to tbe efficiency of tbe army. This may or may not have been so, but tbe transaction, both as to tbe principal and substitute, was illegal. If tbe principal bad been conscripted and forced into tbe army, be would not have been guilty of rebellion; but if be furnished a substitute, tbat act would have been voluntary and illegal.
We will not consider further tbe nice distinctions presented in tbe ingenious argument of tbe plaintiff’s counsel. Tbe fact *528that the money furnished, by the plaintiff placed a soldier in the Confederate army, and was lent with a. full knowledge that it was to be used for that purpose, vitiated the contract, and defeats the plaintiff’s recovery: Cannon v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179, and the authorities cited in the brief of the defendants’ counsel.
Justice Reade dissented.
Pee, Cueiam. Judgment affirmed.