Tbe action began by a petition or complaint sworn to on August 22nd 1868, praying an injunction, wbicb, on tbe same day, was ordered by tbe Judge. A subpoena tberefor, issued on tbe 28tb of August, returnable to-Spring Term 1869, at wbicb time tbe defendant appeared, and moved to dismiss tbe action, on tbe ground that it was governed by tbe Oode of Procedure, and (1) bad not been begun by summons as thereby required; (2) that tbe plaintiff bad neither given a prosecution bond, nor made a deposit; (3) that tbe subpoena was not under tbe seal of tbe court.. Tbe Judge refused to dismiss tbe action, and allowed tbe plaintiff then to give a prosecution bond, and tbe defendant-appealed.
Certain parts of tbe Oode of Civil Procedure, as stated in what is beaded Title XXIII, were ratified on tbe 18th of *356August 1868, and certain other parts, including Title XXII,. and so much of what is printed as Title. XXIII as enacts that the act should go into effect on its ratification, were-ratified on the 24th of August. Although apparently Title XXIII is a part of the Act, yet no part of that Title in fact is so, except the first three lines, which themselves are-inaccurately printed. Obviously, it is impossible that the date of ratification can be contained in the enacting part of a statute, because the statute is enacted before its ratification, and it is impossible for the legislature to foretell at what date it may be ratified. The clause fixing the time at which the Act should go into effect, is found no where except at the end of the whole Act. That part of it ■ which was. ratified on the 18th of August, would not, but for that clause, have gone into effect until thirty days after the adjournment of the legislature. When the last part was enacted, the effect of the concluding clause, was, to make the Act as a whole, take effect from the date of the ratification of that part. We have examined the original manuscript Act in the office of the Secretary of State, and find that the last clause, which is the only one relating to the time at which the Act is to go into effect, is in the following words: u This Act shall go into effect upon its ratification.”
The whole Code is spoken of and treated as but one Act,, and no part of it went into effect before the 24th of August 1868. The present proceeding must be regarded as a suit-pending at the adoption of the Code, and the right of the plaintiff to relief must be tried under the law previously existing.
Under the old system of separate courts of law and equity,, the class of cases in which the plaintiff could demand an injunction as the sole and substantive relief, was very small: e.g. An injunction against the invasion of a copy-right. When the plaintiff had a remedy at law, he was bound to pursue it, and if, in any case, that remedy was inadequate, he might supplement it by the ancillary jurisdiction of a Court of" *357Equity. Biitamerelegulrightwhichraightbeadequatelyadju-dicated in a court of law, was in no case a sufficient ground for a bill in equity. In this case tbe plaintiff’s cause of action is not very clearly stated. He alleges, as we understand bis complaint, that be signed and sealed, but never delivered, a writing purporting to be a deed for certain lands, but that tbe defendant fraudulently got possession of tbe writing, and, by color of it, committed a trespass on tbe lands, to bis damage, &c. It seems to us that bis remedy was clearly at law, either by an action of detinue for tbe pretended deed, or by an action of trespass guare clcmsum fregit. If be bad delivered tbe deed, but bad been induced to make such delivery by fraud, be might have invoked tbe aid of a Court of Equity to protect him against tbe fraudulent and inequitable assertion of tbe admittedly legal title, either as ancillary to an action of trespass, at law, or to a demand by bill in equity to have tbe deed so fraudulently procured, rescinded. But in this case the plaintiff does not allege, but denies, any delivery of tbe deed; if never delivered in fact, it was, in law, not tbe deed of tbe plaintiff, and conferred no right as against him, and bis remedy was tbe purely legal one which every possessor of an estate in lands has against a trespasser. Tried by tbe test of tbe former law, and regarding tbe petition of tbejplaintiff as a bill in equity, we are unable to see any equity by which it can be supported: Irwin v. Davidson, 3 Ire. Eq. 321; Lyerly v. Wheeler, Bus. Eq. 266.
It is unnecessary to notice tbe other points.
Judgment below reversed, and bill dismissed.
Peb Cubiam. Ordered accordingly.