The sole question presented by the record, is one of pleading.
The merits of the controversy are not now before, us ; and we are therefore not at liberty to consider the fact, that the defendant has the plaintiff’s land, and has paid but little or nothing for it.
We are of the opinion that the decree of the Court of Equity, made and ordered to be enrolled at Eall Term 1863, was final; leaving nothing further to be done by the purchaser, Benjaman Ingram, and that so far as he was concerned in that proceeding, it was res adjudieata, the plaintiffs having had their day in court. It may be that the *125plaintiffs' could have obtained tbe relief which, they seek, if the suit had still been pending, by orders made in the cause. This was the mode of procedure in Emerson v. Mallett, Phil. Eq. 234, where there had been no final decree, and therefore the court retained foil control of the whole matter, and could adjust all the equities growing out of it. Indeed, a Court of Equity would not entertain a bill seeking no other relief than that which might have been had by orders in a suit then pending: Rogers v. Holt, Phil. Eq. 108.
On the other hand a final decree could only have been impeached before the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure by a bill of review. Since the adoption of the Code, relief against such a decree can only be had by a civil action, commenced by issuing a summons: Barnes v. Morris, 4 Ire. Eq. 22, cited in the argument by both sides, is not in point, and is mentioned only to show that it has not been overlooked.
There was error in ruling that an action was unnecessary, and that relief might be granted by orders in the cause. Let this be certified.
Pee Cueiam. Error.