Branch v. Goddin, 60 N.C. 105, 1 Win. 105 (1864)

Dec. 1864 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

60 N.C. 105, 1 Win. 105

JOHN R. BRANCH and BENJAMIN F. GARY, Executors of SAMUEL W. BRANCH, vs. N. A. H. GODDIN.

'Ono who has tuadu a gift of slaves, void by the.act of 1806, (Rev, Code/ eh. 60, sect. 12) cannot be estopped to assertdiis title by any act in pais.

Nor is he estopped by the record of a partition of the slaves by a suit, some of the parlies to which, being infants, and his wards, sue by him as their guardian.

The cases of Alston vs. Hamlin, 2 Dev. and Bat. 115, Armficld vs. Modre, Bnsib., -167, and Dixon, vs. Waters, 8 Janes, 449, cited and approved;

This ‘was an action of detinue for slaves named, ■ &c., and was submitted to the decision of Saunders, J., at Halifax Superior Court,’ Fall Term, 1864, on the following case agreed. About the year 1852, Samuel- W. Branch, the plaintiffs’ testator placed the slaves for which this suit is brought, by parol, in the possession of Edward Tillery who had married his daughter, Rebecca. They remained in the possession of the said -Edward, until his death in 1851?: The plaintiffs’ testator administered on his estate, and returned the said slaves in the inventory thereof, and listed and paid taxes on them as such administrator--at November Term, 1862, of Halifax epunty Court, Rebeeca, widow of the said Edward, and "her children, Olivia and Eliza, the latter sueing by the plaintiffs’ testator who had qualified as their guardian, filed their petition for a division of the slaves belpnging to the estate of. said Edward, of which they were tenants in common, specifying in said petition the above-mentioned slaves as belonging to said estate. On the 28th of December, 1862, the said Rebecca intermarried with the defendant N. A. H. Nod-din, and on the 29th of said month, the said slaves, were divided according to a decree made in the said canse, at the previous November sessions. In the division, the slaves sued for. were 'allotted to the defendant and wife. The proceedings were returned in .due form to February sessions, 1868, of said Court,, and the defendant made a party thereto ; the said division was thereupon confirmed, ami ordered to be recorded. The plaintiffs’ testator was present at said division, and fully assenting thereto. He died in January, 1864, having made .and published his last will and testament in writing, of which" the plaintiffs are the. executors, by which he bequeathed the ne-.groes aforesaid, to the sole, separate, and exclusive use of .his daughter,. Rebecca, during’the term of her natural life, and at her death over, &c. But the plaintiffs’, testator never made any demand for said slaves, nor claimed them in Any way, from the time he put them into the possession of his daughter, until his death.

The slaves have been in possession of the defendant and claimed by him as his property since the division on the 29th of December, 1862, and, upon demand of the executors therefor, he refused to deliver, the same, and thereupon this suit was brought.

In the Superior Court judgment was given for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Moore for the plaintiff^

Baitle,- J.

Jn the case of Alston vs. Hamlin, 2 Dev. and Bat., 115, it was decided that the act of 1806, (Rev. Code, ch. 50, sec. 12,) having been enacted on purpose to exclude all parol evidence of a gift of slaves, necessarily avoids every estoppel by parol, which might he setup t* defeat its operation. Hence, where the owner of slave* made a parol gift of them to bis son-in-law, wbo bequeathed them to his children, and died, leaving the do-. nor executor of his will and guardian of his children, ii was held that the taking possession of the slaves and hir-' ing them out, first as executor and.then as guardian, wa* of -no avail to pas* the title ; and that there was no possession adverse to the donor*; and, further, that, the statute of limitations did not begin to run against him until he had permitted a division of the slaves among his grandchildren and delivered them over.

The authority of that ease has always been acknowledged* ; and the principle therein established must entitle the present plaintiffs to a judgment on the case agreed,, unless the partition of the slaves, made under the decree of the County Court of Halifax, • shall be deemed sufficient, t© prevent it. If the plaintiffs’ testator had been a party* to the suit for partition,' then he would have been estopped* by the record from setting up any title to the slaves. Armfield vs. Moore, Busb. Rep., 157, Dixon vs. Warters, 8 Jones Rep., 449. But his being guardian to the infant petitioners in that suit, did not make him a party for the purpose of having any adjudication of his rights. It wa* his duty,-as guardian, to protect the rights .of his ward* (whatever such rights may be) in the suit for partition between them and their mother. Unless the plaintiff*’ testator had been made a party, he could not have any opportunity to assert his title in that suit, and hence he cannot be estopped by any "order or decree in it. The division of the slaves which was-then made, in pursuance of the desree in the cause, and the possession of the parties Vhich fallowed it, had the effect to put the statute of limitations in ’operation; and the testator’s title would have been barred bad not the present suit been commenced within dess than three years from that time. .

What will be the effect of the record, of partition between the parties thereto, when the present plaintiffs «hall assent to the legacy, is a question not presented to us, and upon which, therefore, we refrain from expressing any opinion.

As the case now stands we think that the judgment given in the Court below upon the case agreed, is erroneous, and must be reversed; and a-judgment be entered for the plaintiffs. ;