Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. 41, 2 Mur. 41 (1811)

July 1811 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

6 N.C. 41, 2 Mur. 41

Keddie v. Moore.

From New-Htinover.

The acts of Assembly increasing the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to £30, are not inconsistent or incompatible with the Const! tution of the State.

This was an action of debt, commenced by a warrant issued by a justice of the peace, which- warrant commanded the ministerial officer to whom it was directed., to arrest the body of the Defendant, and have him before some justice of the peace for the county of New-IIanover, to answer the Plaintiff of a plea that he render to him £18, which he owed and detained, &c. The justice before whom the warrant was returned for trial, gave judgment for the Plaintiff, from which judgment the Defendant appealed to the County Court; and upon there turn of the appeal, pleaded in abatement of the warrant, i( that the warrant was issued for a sum above twenty dollars j whereas, by the Constitution of the United States and the Law of the land, a-justice of the peace has no jurisdiction in a sum over twenty dollars, and cannot issue a warrant or render any judgment for a sum greater than twenty dollars.” The Plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the Defendant having joined in demurrer, the case was, by consent, removed to the Superior Court, ami the presiding Judge ordered the case to be sent to this Court, upon the question, “ Whether a justice of the peace, by the Law of tiie land, has jurisdiction over a sum greater than twenty dollars ?”

At this term, Jocelyn argued the, cause for the Defendant ; no counsel appeared for the Plaintiff.

Jocelyn. — The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace has been regularly increased from time to time since the year 1774, up to the year 1802. From five it has increased to thirty pounds. The increase has been gradual, and has therefore not alarmed us ; but if there be no limitation to their jurisdiction, it may eventually swallow up the jurisdiction of our Courts of Justice. Already have the Legislature declared, that a justice of the peace may value specific articles, and give judgment for the value: upon the same principle, his jurisdiction may be extended to cases of trover, libel, trespass, &c. until the right of trial by Jury shall be frittered away entirely. This increase of jurisdiction is inconsistent with the spirit of our Bill of Rights, and the framers of our Constitution certainly intended that some restraint should be imposed upon the power of the Legislature over this subject. The 14th section of the Bill of Rights declares, “ that in all controversies at Law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by Jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the. people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.” How then did the ancient mode of trial by Jury stand ? It extended to all controversies respecting property, where the sum in demand exceeded forty shillings sterling. The 12th section of the same instrument declares, “ that no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the Law of the land.” Upon the same principle that the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace has been extended to all debts, &c. not exceeding thirty pounds, and to assessing’ the value of specific articles, may it bo extended over all personal injuries, and to injuries affecting a man’s freehold. ■ It is contended that the trial by Jury is not taken away by this increase of jurisdiction ; • that the party dissatisfied with the judgment of the justice may appeal to Court, where be may have his cause tried by a Jury. It is true the right of appeal is given by the- Legislature, but this right may be so clogged with difficulties that few can enforce it, and as the Law now stands, it often deprives the poor, who cannot give security for an appeal, of the right of trial by Jury. But if the Bill of Rights is to control the Legislature upon this subject, no man can be deprived of his property but ■“ by the Law of the land." IIow does “ the Law of the land," here spoken of, declare that “ controversies respecting property shall be determined ?” Not by a justice of the peace, but by the “ ancient mode of trial by Jury," that mode of trial which this solemn instrument declares, shall remain “ sacred and inviolable." The Bill of Rights is the paramount Law of the land, and any act of the Legislature at variance with its provisions, is null and void. It is time to meet this question with firmness, and to check the growth of that power which has already become alarming. From the increase of justices and of their jurisdiction, we are threatened with an aristocracy of the most odious kind, and nothing seems likely to prevent its establishment, but the interposition of the Judiciary i that tribunal which spreads the shield of the Constitution over the citizen,, and protects him from the unlawful attacks of the Legislative power.

Locke, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is intended, by the question arising upon this demurrer, to ascertain whether the act of Assembly, increasing the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to the sum of thirty pounds, bo inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, os.* not $ and to shew that it is, the 14th section of the Bill of Rights is relied upon. This sccj.j[on declares, “ that in all controversies at Law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by. Jury is one of the best, securities of the' rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.” It is alleged, that at the time this Declaration of Rights was made, a justice of the peace had jurisdiction of sums only to the amount of forty shillings sterling, and that all the acts passed by the Legislature since that period, increasing the jurisdiction of a justice, are inconsistent and incompatible with this clause in. the Declaration of Rights.

It must be admitted, that if, upon a fair examination of these several acts, they should be found incompatible with this or any other provisional’ the Constitution, it would be tire duty of this Court at once to declare such acts void, and pronounce judgment for the Defendant. Otherwise to decide for the Plaintiff.

When the Convention declared that the ancient mode of trial by Jury should be preserved, no restriction was thereby laid on the Legislature as to erecting or organizing judicial tribunals, in such manner as might be most conducive to the public convenience and interest, on a change of circumstances affected by a variety of causes. It is true, that the Legislature cannot impose any provisions substantially restrictive of the trial by Jury : they may give existence to new Forums ; they may modify the powers and jurisdiction of former Courts, in such instances as are not interdicted by the Constitution, from which their legitimate power is derived : but still the sacred right of every citizen, of having a trial by Jury, must be preserved. These remarks lead us to enquire, whether the several acts passed by the Legislature, increasing a justice’s jurisdiction, have taken from the citizen this right, or not ?

At the time the Constitution was formed, it must have been well known to the framers of that instrument, that a justice of the peace had jurisdiction ©ver sums of forty shillings sterling and uridér ,* and that too without the intervention of a Jury. Did they mean, by the 14th section of the Declaration of Rights, entirely to destroy this jurisdiction, and have the benefit of the trial by Jury, in the first instance, in every possible case, ? Or did they intend, that when property came in question, (which was always tried in a Court of Justice by a Jury) this ancient and beneficial mode of trial should still be preserved ? It appears to the Court that the latter was /the object for which they intended to make provision. The Legislature has also given to either party the right of appealing to a Court, where he will have the benefit of a trial by Jury. It cannot, therefore, be said, that the right of such trial is taken away. So long as the trial by Jury is preserved through an appeal, the preliminary mode of obtaining it may be varied at the, will and pleasure of the Legislature. The party wishirig^fo appeal may be subjected to some inconvenience in getting security, but this inconvenience does not in this, no,? in any other case where security is required, amount to a denial of right. In conformity with the opinion here given, is the case of Emerick v. Harris, (1 Binney’s Rep, 416,) decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where the provision in the Constitution is the same, and where the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace has been gradually increáscd. The Court, therefore, cannot view this as a case which will warrant the Judiciary to exercise an act of such paramount and delicate authority as to interfere with the act of the Legislature.

Let the demurrer be sustained, and plea in abatement be overruled.