Johnson v. Peterson, 59 N.C. 12, 6 Jones Eq. 12 (1860)

Dec. 1860 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

59 N.C. 12, 6 Jones Eq. 12

JOSEPH JOHNSON against JOSHUA PETERSON.

A conveyance, by a woman, after a marriage engagement, and upon the eve of its solemnization, is a fraud upon the rights of the intended husband and will not be upheld, unless it appear clearly and unequivocally, that the husband had full knowledge of the transaction and freely assented to it.

Where a woman, being under an engagement to marry, made, a week before the marriage, a voluntary secret conveyance of all her property, including slaves, to the defendant, a man of slender means, who, after the marriage, took the slavesinto his possession, and refused, on demand, to give them up, but claimed them as his own, under such conveyance, it was held that the husband was entitled to writs to restrain the defendant from removing the slaves out of the State, although no threat to do so was made to appear.

This was an appeal from an interlocutory order, made in. the Court of Equity of'Sampson county, refusing to dissolve an injunction, and continuing it over to the hearing. FRENCH, J., presiding.

The bill sets forth, that the plaintiff intermarried with Susan Peterson on 14th of March, 1860 ; that shortly before the said marriage, and after an agreement had been entered into with the said Susan, that they should marry, and only a week before that event, she secretly, and without his knowledge, and in fraud of his 'marital rights, conveyed to the defendant, Joshua Peterson, by three several deeds, her interest in ten slaves, (naming them) and a right to live upon and ánjoy a tract of land of 186 acres, during the time of her, the said Susan’s, marriage life, and providing in said deeds, that on her becoming discovert, her right to the said property should revive; that the said deeds are expressed to be, each, on the consideration of five dollars, but that no money or other thing of value was paid for the said property; that the said Susan had, under the will of a former husband, a life-estate in the said negroes and land, and that the defendant has taken possession of the said slaves and land, and on the same being demanded, refuses to give them up, and has threatened to run them out of the State ; that the defendant is irresponsible in respect of financial means, having no property, except a remainder in two of these slaves after the death of the said Susan. The prayer of the bill is for an injunction and sequestration to prevent defendant from running the slaves out of the State. These writs were issued in vacation, and the defendant answered at the next term. He does not deny the execution of the deeds, nor the time nor circumstances under which they were executed. He denies, however, that any fraud was intended, and says, though he paid no money, that the said Susan had promised him, before the engagement of marriage, to make him such conveyances, and that she owed him for one year’s work-he had done for her, and that he intended to give her a credit for what she owed him. He denies that he ever threatened to remove the said slaves from the State, or that he intends to do so, but admits he is a man of slender means, beyond his claim in these slaves, and insists on the validity of his claim to the property, under the deeds. He denies that the plaintiff was ignorant of the existence of these deeds, for that one of the family had put him on his guard, by telling him in the presence of the said Susan, that he would not get what he expected to get by his intermarriage with her, to which he replied, that “it was not the property he wanted, but the woman.” On the coming in of the answer, the defendant moved to dissolve the injunction and sequestration, which was refused by his Honor, who ordered them to be continued to the hearing; from which order, the defendant appealed.

W. A. Wright, for the plaintiff.

Person, for the defendant.

MáNly, J.

The interlocutory order appealed from, continuing the injunction to the hearing, is justified by the facts of the case, apparent upon the bill and answer.

The equity of the bill seems to us to be manifest. The time, manner, and circumstances altogether, when, and whereby the woman stripped herself of every particle of her property, was a fraud upon the rights of her intended husband. Such a conveyance after a marriage engagement, and upon the eve of its solemnization, is fraudulent, and not fit to be upheld, unless the intended husband have full knowledge of and freely assent to it. Such knowledge and assent ought to be clear and unequivocal, and not inferable merely from casual remarks by an indifferent person in the hearing of the husband, and from responses of his, made in a spirit of gallantry.

"When the right to the relief sought is clear, the Court will incline favorably to ancillary writs intended to make sure that relief. Thus, in the case before us, where the bill is to declare fraudulent and void deeds for slaves, and to compel a reconveyance and redelivery of them, the Court will, upon any grounds that are not light and frivolous, put the defendant under an injunction not to withdraw the property from the reach of its process. An injunction imposes no obligation on him that he was not already bound in conscience to fulfil. It only adds a legal penalty to a moral obligation.

Although the principal allegation, in the bill, of a purpose to remove the slaves beyond the juristiction of our courts, is denied by the defendant, yet, he admits he sets up claim to them under the deeds in question, and does not deny that he is a man of little or no means beyond the slaves in controversy. ' This, we think, is sufficient, when added to the clear ©quity of the plaintiff’s bill, and the consequent unconscien-tiousness of the defense, to cause the Court to leave the defendant under the injunction.

It should be certified to the Court below, that there is no error in the interlocutory order appealed from, and that they do', therefore, proceed.

Pée Cueiam, Judgment affirmed.