Reeves v. Long, 58 N.C. 355, 5 Jones Eq. 355 (1860)

June 1860 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

58 N.C. 355, 5 Jones Eq. 355

HUGH C. REEVES against THOMAS LONG AND JOHN M. FAUCETT.

A provision in a will, allowing a slave to select a master, and fixing His pries-at five hundred dollars, the slave being between the ages, of forty-five and fifty years, is not against the policy of our law.

Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Orange county.

William Baldwin, late of the county aforesaid, died in the month of April, 1859, leaving a last will and testament, one clause of which, is in the following words: “ It is my will that my negro man, Jesse, to choose his own master, that will pay to ftiy executors five hundred dollars, in nine months after my decease, and direct them to make title as executors to my last will and testament.” The defendants, in this suit, are the executors appointed by this will. The testator left a large amount of personal property, more than sufficient to meet his liabilities, without recourse to the slave mentioned above. In pursuance of the license allowed him by the will, the slave selected the plaintiff, Hugh C. Reeves, as his master. Reeves applied to the defendants to make him a title to the slave, and tendered to them a bond, with sufficient sureties, for the payment of the price fixed in the will, within nine months from the death of the testator. The defendants refused to make tille or deliver the .slave. The bill is filed by the plaintiff, Reeves, praying that the defendants may be decreed to •deliver him the slave and convey him the title.

The canse was set for hearing on bill, answer, exhibits and proofs, and sent to this Court.

Graham, for the plaintiff.

Phillips, for the defendants.

Manly, J.

We cannot perceive any sufficient reason for not carrying into execution the testator’s will in respect to the slave, Jesse.

It is certainly the policy of the law to keep the races of white and black distinct from each other, and to maintain in the governing race, all needful, legal authority^, and secure on the part of the governed unconditional subordination and obedience. This is a necessity of the condition of things amongst, us, and essential to preserve the civilization that happily exists. But we are unable to understand the force of the objection, that this policy is contravened by the clause of the will in question.

The substance of the arrangement, made for the slave, is, that, he shall be sold to a master, of his own selection, at the price of five hundred dollars. The power of selection and the lowness of the price, are the points insisted upon as vicious in their tendencies. But to hold that these vitiate tine purpose of the testator and make void his will, in respect to that slave, would be to exclude from the system of slavery every indulgence in its management, or at least, so to hedge it about, in this respect, as to make it stiff and harsh, and thus impart to it an aspect it does not now possess. Taken alone, the permission to choose a master, cannot be considered an unreasonable license. The price fixed is not so grossly inadequate for a man, between forty-five and fifty years of age, as to vsitiate this license. It is an obvious mode of giving effect to it, by widening the field of selection somewhat, and making it a substantial boon instead of a mockery. Thus disposed of, he is not the less a slave in law. The master holds him in the same absolute bondage in which all slaves are held, and is amenable for his management. If from any sense of obligation, he indulge him with liberties outside of the limits prescribed by law, the nuisance may be abated and the master punished.

"We are of opinion, therefore, that the direction by the testator to his executors, to dispose of the slave, Jesse, to the person whom he might choose, and who would bo willing to pay five hundred dollars for him, is not against public policy.

We forbear to discuss the matter further, as it underwent so recently, at the last term of this Court, full consideration, in a case, in all respects, similar to this; Harrison v. Everett, ante, page 163. There seems to have been proper precaution used in getting from the slave a deliberate and unbiased choice of a master, and we see no reason why the person selected, Hugh C. Beeves, should not have a decree for the surrender to him of the said slave, upon the payment of five hundred dollars, which he proffers to do. .

Pee OueiaM, Decree accordingly.