The bill is filed to enjoin the defendants from collecting a bond executed by the plaintiff, to Thomas P. Little, under the following circumstances: Wm. P. Little, sr., -died in the year 1827, greatly indebted, and possessed of a large real an d personal estate. The last clause in his will is as follows: After appointing his sons, Thomas P. and George Little, and his wife, Mrs. Anne Little, his executors and executrix, they “ are hereby vested with full and ample power to sell any part of my estate, real or personal, whenever they may think proper to do so, &c.” Under this power, the executors and executrix,'acting by the advice of counsel, sold the land which the testator owned in Tennessee, and some in this State, believing that, as negroes were low in value in this State, and the lands were held at high prices in Tennessee, it was the best course to pursue to pay the debts of the -estate. Subsequently, a bill was filed by the legatees-of Wm. P. Little, of *161whom the plaintiff was one, for a settlement of the estate, and an account of the disbursement of the assets by the executors. In that case the court declare that the land was not charged in the will in exoneration of the personalty, but that the latter was the primary fund for the payment of the testator’s debts, and decreed an account. A reference was made to the cleric to take the accounts, and lie reported that the defendants owed the plaintiff and his brothers on the 11th of January, 1851, $2,922,18. This report was confirmed, and a decree rendered in accordance thereto. This decree is still in force, unreversed. Of the sum so decreed, the defendant Thomas P. Little paid to Mr. Ilaywood, the guardian of the plaintiff, $1,200. The plaintiff was then a minor. A year or two before he come of age, he went to the house of the defendant Dr. Skinner, who had married his aunt, which he made his residence. Dr. Skinner was of the opinion that the legatees had all been equally benefitted by the sale of the land instead of the slaves. In February, 1851, while the plaintiff was at his house, finding, as he says in his answer, that ho indulged in unkind feelings towards his uncle T. P. Little', on account of his delay in paying the decree, he (Skinner) determined to give him a full explanation of the whole business, and told him he did not regard the decree against his uncle T. P. Little as just; that lie did not intend to profit by it, and he did not believe any of the other children would, and that there- were reasons why the plaintiff and his brothers should bo liberal as well as lenient towards Thomas P. Little — namely, that while all the other children of 17m. P. Little had accounted for their board, &c., while they remained with their mother, Mrs. Little, neither plaintiff’s mother, nor his father, nor their children,, had accounted for any tiling; and if they had so accounted, they would have been largely in her debt, and he believed all the other legatees had executed their releases. The plaintiff observed if these tilings were so, if his uncle paid the decree, he would consider it as a loan, and give his bond to refund when lie came of age.
In a subsequent conversation, after the plaintiff had been to *162Raleigh, be said to Hr. Skinner, be bad had a conversation with bis guardian, E. G. Haywood, who informed Mm that what be, Skinner, told him, was not so, and was contradicted by the record of the Supreme Court, and that the other parties bad not released. This statement the defendant Skinner denied, and then repeated over to the plaintiff what he had said in the previous conversation. At this time, the defendant Little was at the bouse of Hr. Skinner, and the latter thought the plaintiff was satisfied, and introduced the subject again by inquiring of him if he had made up bis mind to repay to bis uncle Little the amount received on the decree, “saying that if be had, it might be arranged then.” The plaintiff hesitated for a moment as if he were not prepared to answer, and then remarked it was a hard case for his uncle to pay the money, and he would be willing to give up bis share if he knew his brothers would do so when they came of age, but it was uncertain what they would do then. Finally, after some reflection, he said he did intend to repay his uncle, and he would execute his note for his share of the decree, and the note was executed, Little being present. After its delivery, the defendant Skinner took the note from T. P. Little, with an endorsement in blank, and gave him credit for the amount. This is the statement taken from the answers of Hr. Skinner and T. P. Little.
The question is, will a Court of Equity suffer an obligation, executed under such circumstances, to be enforced against the plaintiff?
It is admitted that a voluntary bond is as binding between the parties in a Court of Equity as in a Court of Law. This is emphatically a voluntary bond, there being no consideration. Will the court suffer it to be enforced under the peculiar circumstances of the transaction ? A nephew is induced by one uncle, with whom he was residing at the time, to make a donation to another uncle, of a bond for a large sum of money. The plaintiff was a young man just emerging out of his minority, unacquainted with business, ignorant of the facts of the ease, addicted to the too free use of spirituous liquors, in the *163bouse with Ms two úneles, T. P. Little and Dr. Skinner, urged by the latter to execute a bond to the former for a large sum of money, when, at that moment, it is very clear that the uncleT. P. Little was indebted to the nephew in a much larger sum.
The case bears a strong analogy to the class of cases in which trustees and others, acting in a fiduciary character, are forbidden to contract with their cestids que trust. But it properly belongs to another class mentioned by Mr. Adams, p. 184, where there is no technical fiduciary relation existing between the parties, but one stands in the relation of special confidence towards the other, so as to acquiré an habitual influence over him, where he cannot accept from him a personal benefit without exposing himself to the risk, proportioned to the nature of their connexion, of having it set aside as unduly obtained. Even where the only relation is that of friendly and habitual reliance on advice and assistance, care must be taken that no undue advantage shall be obtained; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 M. and K., 113; Dent v. Bennet, 4 M. and C., 269. The proper jurisdiction of a court of Equity is to take every one’s act according to conscience, and not to suffer undue advantage to be taken of the strict forms of law, or of positive rules; 1 Stor. Eq. sec. 331. Hence, says Justice Stoet, if there be no proof of actual fraud or imposition, yet, if upon the whole circumstances, the contract appears t® be grossly against conscience, or grossly unreasonable and oppressive, courts of Equity may, and will, grant relief; Nott v. Hill, 2 Vern. 167, 211; Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. Williams, 290. Here, the court cannot but see that the contract in question is against conscience, and grossly unreasonable; Suttles v. Hay, 6 Ire. Eq. 124. Upon this point the ease of Archer v. Hudson, 29, E. Ch. Rep. 360, is very strong. There, a Miss Kendray executed a note payable to a bank, as surety for her uncle, McDaniel, and for his benefit. She had been residing with her uncle but two months. The object of the note was fully explained to her by the agent of the bank, in procuring her signature, and she fully understood it. The Master of the Polls says, “ The relation between the *164parties is- undoubted. She, by signing the note for the benefit' of her uncle,. standing in loco parentis, without any consideration or advantage to-herself, became subject to-this liability. This is a transaction which, under ordinary circumstances, this Court will not allow.” Again, the court say, “ Nobody ever asserted that there could not be a pecuniary transaction between a parent and a child, the child being of age; but every body will affirm in this Court that, if there be a pecuniary transaction between a parent and a child just after the child attains twenty-o-ne years of age, and prior to what may be called complete emancipation, without any benefit to the child, the presumption is, that an undue influence has been exercised to procure that liability on the part of the child, and it is the duty and the business of the party who endeavors to maintain such a transaction, to show that the presumption is adequately rebutted.” The answers in our case furnish the only evidence in the case, and from them we mainly derive the true character of this transaction. The two defendants were the uncles of the plaintiff. They were both present when the bond was executed, and the answer of Dr. Skinner shows plainly the influence he possessed over the plaintiff. He went to the house of Dr. Skinner an inebriate, and during the short time he sojourned there, the uncle succeeded, in some measure, in rescuing him from this degrading and inveterate habit, and if the Doctor has succeeded in his kind and benevolent effort, it will be worth to the plaintiff more- than double the amount of his bond. But this is beside the present question, except in showing Dr. Skinuer’s influence over him. Ignorant and incapable of judging of his rights, he trusted to his friend and connection, Dr. Skinner, took his advice and information about the business, in preference to that of him who had lately been his guardian, his- guide and director. Eor when, upon his return to the house of his uncle, he informed him that Mr. Haywood had told him that he (the Dr.) had not given him a correct view of the decree obtained by him and the other legatees, as appeared from the record of the suit, and the decree, the Doctor did not hesitate to tell him Mr. Haywood was *165wrong, that he had examined the- record and it was as he-liad represented it to him. He chose to-trust to the opinion of Dr„ Skinner in preference to that of his late guardian. All this shows the influence which the uncle- had acquired over the-nephew. Eut it turns out that Mi-. Haywood was right, and Dr. Skinner was wrong.. Under this ignorance of his rights and obligation, he executed the bond, distant from all his other friends and relatives with whom he might have counselled. Another fact disclosed by the answer is important: when, on his return to Dr. Skinner’s, the plaintiff did not advert to the note which he had promised to give, until reminded of it by Dr. Skinner, he was then reluctant to execute it, but after some time did so. We do not mean to say that any actual fraud was perpetrated by Dr. Skinneiy or any intended. He, no doubt, believed what he stated.. But where an individual-pronounces a decree of a court of justice unjust, he ought to be very certain he is right. Hero, however,, the question is-not one of direct and actual fraud, but of undue influence used to the injury of the plaintiff by the defendants; I say the defendants, for they were both present at the execution-of the bond, and after its execution it was handed to Little,, who immediately transferred it to Dr. Skinner, who gave him-a credit for it on his account. We consider Dr.. Skinner as standing throughout this transaction in the relation of a parent towards the plaintiff.
It was said in- the argument that there was a moral obligation on the plaintiff to refund the money paid by Mr. Little to his guardian, because he had been injured to a large amount by being made to account for the value of lands improperly sold by him. We cannot perceive how that lias worked an injury to-him, for the slaves that had belonged to William P.. Little had been sold to replace the landed fund. If he suffered by that transaction, he suffered in company with all the rest of the legatees. In truth, his suffering- was contingent upon-the amount of personal property Mrs. Anne Little might ha veto dispose of at her death.
Upon these grounds, we are of opinion that the injunction *166ought to have been continued until the hearing. There is no error in the order appealed from.
It is admitted that while the plaintiff was a minor, living as a guest with the defendant Skinner, a near relative, he was told by Skinner that the decree of the Supreme Court, under the peculiar circumstances, operated umjustl/y upon his uncle, the other defendant; and that the' views of the case that had been given to him by his guardian, with whom he had consulted, were erroneous, and that the plaintiff was thereby induced, in ten days after ai’riving at full age, to execute the note in controversy. I put my opinion on the ground of “ equity confessed by the answer.”
Conceding to the defendant perfect sincerity and honesty of purpose, which I cheerfully do, it was surely incumbent on him, after taking the responsibility of opposing his view of the case to that of the Supreme Court, and of the plaintiff’s guardian, in regard to the justice of thq decree in its operation on the other defendant, to set forth the grounds upon which his opinion was based, and by which it could be supported; this he failed to do. On the contrary, according to the facts admitted, the decree gives to the plaintiff no more than he was, in conscience, at liberty to take, and does not take from the defendant Little one eent that he could in conscience keep. The testator gives certain of his slaves and other personal property, together with Ms land, to his widow for life, and them, to his clvildjren. Certain others of his slaves he gives to his widow absolutely, and charges his whole estate with the payment of debts, with power to sell both the real and personal estate for that purpose. After his death, the widow and the other executors agree that, owing to the peculiar circumstances, it was most advisable to pay off the debts by a sale of the slaves, in which she had but a life estate, and of the land in which, .also, she had but a life estate. The slaves in which, under the will, she took the absolute estate, were in this way exonerated. 8he had no right in conscience to take any benefit from this peculiar state of things, other than that which was *167common to berself and the others interested in the property ; and by a well-settled principle of equity, the justice of which no one can call in question, and which was acted upon as the basis of the decree referred to, inasmuch as the slaves in which she had the absolute estate, although primarily liable, were exonerated by a sale o'f the land in their stead, they were charged with the amount raised by the sale of the land. The result thus produced, so far from being vm¿us% was in strict accordance with the most refined notions of justice, and as such would strike anyone who had not some preconceived prej 11-dices to the contrary. It is true that this view of the case may not have presented itself to Mrs. Little, and she distributed her bounties and hospitalities among her children according to her own good pleasure, considering herself the absolute owner of those slaves; and the prin ciple of substitution, announced by the decree which required the la/nd-money to be replaced by a sale of slaves, made her estate that much less than she and those members of the family who had imbibed impressions from her, supposed it to be. Still this does not even give color to the allegation that the decree worked injustice to the defendant Little. It is admitted that the slaves on hand, which had belonged to the testator, were more than sufficient to replace the “ land-money.” So, the individual estate of no one of the executors was charged with one cent by reason of the decree, and how the decree operated unjustly in respect to the defendant Little, is not shown or suggested. I concur the opinion that the injunction ought to be continued until the hearing.
Per Oueiam, Decree to be certified.