Horton v. Cook, 54 N.C. 270, 1 Jones Eq. 270 (1854)

Aug. 1854 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

54 N.C. 270, 1 Jones Eq. 270

PHINEAS HORTON against ADAM COOK.

An entry, celling for “;i chemiut tree, in a known line as a beginning corner, and lying on the bead waters of Elk Creek, and between tbe land* of other persons,” is sufficiently certain to sustain a grant on it.

Where A makes an entry which loses its priority by the lapse of time, and B makes another, which is also permitted to lapse, both stand on the samo footing, under the act of 1850, and A having got a grant af.er Is’.-. entry lapsed, it was held to be good.

Cause removed to this Court from the Court of Equity of Watauga county, at Spring Term, 1854. „

The plaintiff made his entry for the tract of laud in dispute On 21st September, 1847, and bad the same surveyed on the 25ih January, 1850. On the 1st December, 1850, he obtained a grant from tbe State. On the 4th day of November, in the year 1844, the defendant añade an entry for one hundred acres of land, which was surveyed, and a grant obtained, on tbe 11th of March, 1850, which covers tbe greater, and only valuable part of the land surveyed for tbe plaintiff, and granted to him as above stated.

It is alleged in the plaintiff’s bill, that the survey was made of his entry before that of the defendant was surveyed, and that the defendant was present, and assisted plaintiff in making the survey, and encouraged him in doing so, by pointing out the corners of adjacent tracts, and showing him how and where he might include the best of the vacant land, where they were running ; that he fraudulently and deceitfully concealed from him the fact that he had a previous entry, which could bo extended over the land in question, and by various pretences of good offices and friendship, put the plaintiff off his guard, and caused him to delay the taking out his grant; that after plaintiff had made his survey, the defendant went forward and made his survey of the hundred -acre tract, so as knowingly to include the fifty acre tract which plaintiff had had surveyed, and avers that there was enough vacant land there for him to have got the compliment under his entry without encroaching upon the land surveyed for him, the plaintiff. He sets forth the defendant’s entry as follows : “ Adam Cook “ enters one hundred acres of land in Wilkes county, on the “ head waters of Elk Creek, between Jacob Lewis and James “Brown’s line, beginning at a chesnut in James Brown’s “line, and running various courses for compliment;” and insists that it is too vague, uncertain, and indefinite to entitle the plaintiff to any preference over him. The prayer is for a conveyance of so much of the fifty acres, granted to plaintiff, as is covered by the prior grant of the defendant.

The answer of the defendant denies all fraud and misrepre* tation ; he admits that he did go with the plaintiff, and assist him in pointing out corners, and in showing him the good land, but he says that he did this under the full assurance and conviction that the time for completing his title was passed, and that the defendant had acquired an indefeasible right against him ; but afterwards he found that the plaintiff had let his entry lapse, without having done anything to secure a priority, and being advised that they both then stood on the same ground, be did not believe there was anything against conscience, in endeavoring to get the first grant, and accordingly he did so.

There was replication and commissions, and some proofs •taken, but the material portion of them are mentioned in the opinion of the Court.

Lenovr for plaintiff.

Weal for defendant.

Battle, J.

There is not much difficulty in determining the relative rights of these parties, if we attend to the dates of their respective entries, and grants. The plaintiff made his entry on the 21st day of September, 1847, had it surveyed the 25th day of January, 1850, and obtained his grant on the 1st day December, in the same year. The defendant’s entry was made on the 4th day of November 1844, and although the date of his survey is not particularly stated, yet we infer from the pleadings, that it was after that of the plaintiff’s: but his grant was prior to the’ plaintiff’s; to wit: the 11th day of March 1850. It appears then, that the defendant precedes the plaintiff, both in making his entry and obtaining his grant. But the plaintiff seeks to .avoid the effects of that priority, so far as the entry is concerned, by alleging that when his survey was made, the defendant was present, and by his fraudulent representations, induced the plaintiff to include in it, lands for which the defendant afterwards obtained his grant. lie contends, also, that the defendant’s entry was too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to be of any force against his entry and survey, because his survey was prior to that of the defendant, which he insists gives to him the effect of a prior entry, of which the defendant had notice at the time when he obtained his grant. But if this be not so, then the plaintiff contends that the act of 1850, ch. 59, See Ire. Dig, Man. page 182, by virtue of which the defendant had the right to' talce out his grant, contains a proviso by which the plaintiff’s right-as a junior enterer was saved.

Neither of the grounds of defence, against the effects of the defendant’s prior entry and grant, can avail the plaintiff. The allegation of fraud and misrepresentation is expressly denied and disproved by the defendant. As to that, then, the •plaintiff fails upon the question of fact. The objection to the vagueness and uncertainty of the defendant’s entry, and its effects upon his rights, is equally against the plaintiff. Such an objection would have come with more force from the plaintiff, to repel the allegation of notice of the defendant’s entry, if he had obtained the first grant; hut in truth, the defendant’s entry was sufficiently definite, and certain to fix the plaintiff with the actual notice which, it is clear from the proofs he had of it. It specifies a certain tree, in a certain line of another tract of land, at which it commences; and it mentions the head waters of the creek on which, and the tracts of land belonging to other persons, between which it is located. In that respect it differs materially from the entries set forth in the case of Johnson v. Shelton, 4 Ired. Eq. 85; Monroe v. McCormick, 6 Ired. Eq. 85, and Fuller v. Williams, Busb. Eq. Rep. 162, and is sufficient to sustain the proof of actual notice of it, according to the principles established in the case of Harris v. Ewing, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 369.

The last and main ground upon which the plaintiff contends that, he is entitled to relief is, that at the time when he made his entry, the defendants entry had lapsed, and the acts of 1848 ch. 54, Sec. 2, and 1850 ch. 59 sec. 2, which gave further time for paying the purchase money to the State, and perfecting the title contains a proviso in favour of- junior entries by virtue of which his, the plaintiff’s, right was made the preferable one. That would have been true, had the plaintiff after making his entry, proceeded to pay the purchase money, and take out his grant within the time prescribed by law, Bryson v. Dobson, 3 Ired. Eq. Rep. 138, Buchanon v. Fitzgerald 6 Ired. Eq. 121. But unfortunately for tire plaintiff, Iris entry lapsed by reason of Iris not Raving paid the purchase money, and taken out his grant, on or before -the 31st day of December 1849, 1 Rev. Stat. ch. 42 sec. 10. Tie was therefore compelled to claim the aid of the act of 1850, ch. 59 sec. 2, which extended the time for the benefit of the defendant’s entry, as well as for his own. They both then stood upon the same footing, and we can see no reason why the defendant’s equity is not as good as that of the plaintiff, and thus give application to the maxim that “ gui prior esi tempore portior est jure.” Indeed in the case of Bryson v. Donsosr, the court say, arguendo, that the law is so “ when applied to two entries, which had both lapsed, and were both revived by the act. As neither could get the land, but by that act, they stand on the same ground, and then the general principle applies, that priority of time in making payment creates a priority of equity.” The act to which reference was made, was the act of 1842 ch. 35 sec. 2, the object of which is the same as that of 1850 ch. 59, and the latter must receive the same construction in this respect, as the former. The bill must be dismissed wi-h costs.

Decree accordingly.