The decision of the case depends upon the construction of the instrument of writing, set forth in the bill of exceptions. The circumstances under which that instrument was given by the defendant, Williams, must be considered, in order to arrive at a proper understanding of its meaning. It was presented to the plaintiff by the defendant, Miller, at the time when the latter was purchasing from the plaintiff a number of beef cattle. Of course, then, it must have been intended as a security to the plaintiff in the credit which he was giving to Miller; for if the purchase were for cash, the instrument was entirely unnecessary. In the light of a security, why was a time fixed for its termination ? Certainly, because the credit was to expire at that time, for, 'in no other way can we affix any sensible meaning to it. Understood in tliat sense, the plaintiff could not sue Miller before, nor on that day ; neither could he,'according to the terms of the agrceiheut, sue the other party until he was prepared to sue both. When was he to sue them ? The answer is within a reasonable time after the expiration of the credit; and a writ, returnable to the next term of the court, in which process was duly executed after that time, must, we think, be deemed a reasonable time within the contemplation of the parties.
But it is said that such suit was of no avail, because the plaintiff, by his neglect, in not employing counsel, was non-suited. That is true, but the nonsuit was on the motion of *393the defendants, and they cannot now be heard to object to what was done at their instance. This latter objection does not seem to have been relied upon by the defendant, Williams, in the Court below, and we only notice it, because, from the facts stated, it has been presented, and has been urged in the argument before us.
Thinking that his Honor erred in the construction, which he put upon the written instrument, we must reverse the judgment of nonsuit, and order a venire de novo.
Judgment reversed.