Luther v. Skeen, 53 N.C. 356, 8 Jones 356 (1861)

June 1861 · Supreme Court of North Carolina
53 N.C. 356, 8 Jones 356

ISHAM LUTHER v. NOAH R. SKEEN.

Reports that the plaintiff swore to a lie or lies in a distant county, cannot properly be submitted to a jury iu an action of slander as elements, from which a jury are to make up an estimate of their own of the character of the plaintiff.

A jury in estimating character, are to fake the testimony of witnesses who *357are supposed to be able or capable of reflecting in general terms, the judgment of the public.

Matters elicited on a cross-examination, which are only admissible to weaken the force cf the testimony in chief, ought not to go to the jury for a different purpose.

This was an action of slander, tried before Howard, J., at the last Spring Term of Davidson Superior Court.

The action was brought for charging the plaintiff with having trumped up and sworn to an account.

The following is the case sent to this Court: “The plaintiff introduced several witnesses to prove his general character, who said his character was good. The defendant’s counsel then asked them if they had not heard that plaintiff had sworn to a lie in Randolph ; to this plaintiff’s counsel excepted. The Court then said to defendant’s counsel ‘you must not ask the witness questions as to any particular offence, or what any particular person had said, but you may ask if there was a current report in the neighborhood that plaintiff had sworn to lies while living in Randolph.’ To this question, plaintiff’s counsel excepted. All of the witnesses answered that there was. Upon being further questioned by plaintiff’s counsel, some of them said the report wras confined to a particular suit with one Nance. Others, that the report covered two instances of false swearing, at least. Each of the witnesses said he did not remember to have heard the report from more that three or four persons, but that he heard those persons speak of it before the dispute between plaintiff and defendant arose. The plaintiff moved from.Raudolph to Davidson four or five years ago.

The Court charged the jury that the testimony was permitted to go to them, not as a justification, but for their consideration in awarding damages; that it was for them, alone, to say what damages ought to be given to the plaintiff, either for' the injury to his character, or as an example to deter others from slandering their neighbor, and that it was right and proper that they should know the exact standing of plaintiff; as it was supposed that they would give greater damage for an *358imputation upon the character of a man above suspicion or reproach, than for an imputation upon one whose character was not so fair.; but that was a matter about which they were allowed to exercise their own discretion.” Plaintiffs counsel excepted to the charge.

Yerdict for plaintiff for $2. Judgment and appeal by plaintiff.

McLean, for the plaintiff.

Kittrell, for the defendant.

Battle, J.

Upon the case presented to this Court, we think there is error in this: His Honor allowed matters elicited on a cross-examination, and which were only admissible to weaken the the force of the testimony in chief, to go to the jury for a different purpose.

The evidence in regard to the reports in Randolph county, were improperly submitted to the jury as elements from which they might make up an estimate of their own of the character of plaintiff. That is not the way in which juries are informed as to character. They take the testimony of a witness who is supposed to be capable of reflecting in general terms the judgment of the public, and rely upon that. Any other mode would but multiply occasions for scandalous strife, and prove impracticable in its results. A current report and general character are not equivalent and convertable terms. The one may bo evidence of the other, but is not conclusive-1y so.

While, therefore, the evidence of the report in Randolph might be properly brought out on a cross-examination with a view to analyse and test the foundation of the witness’ testimony, and might be used by the jury in estimating the weight of such testimony, it was not proper it should be used in any other connexion. It was not proper it should be used as direct evidence of general character.

There should be a venire de novo.

Per Curiam,

Judgment reversed.