Detinue for several slaves which the plaintiff Elizabeth owned, and possessed before her intermarriage with Johnston. On the day of her marriage, and before it’s solemnization, she made a bill of sale to her mother of the negroes in question, without the knowledge or consent of her intended husband; and the question submitted to this court was, whether the plaintiffs are estopped by that deed from maintaining this action.
Nash, for the plaintiff,
insisted that the deed being manifestly in fraud of the marital rights, was essentially void, not only against the husband, but also against the wife, who might have set it aside in a court of equity. It would have been no objection there, that the party seeking relief was a particeps criminis; for then there would be no redress at all against the fraud, and no body to ask it. 1 Vern. 340 2 Vern. 466. 1 P. Williams 496. The deed having then no operation, cannot amount to an estoppel against the party making it, or others claiming through him. A court of law has concurrent jurisdiction on this subject with a court of equity. 3 Wils. 349. 1 Burr. 396.
Norwood, for the defendant.
—The wife cannot claim in this court against her own solemn deed, and the husband deriving his title from her, cannot have a better one than she had. If the plaintiff can make out a case proper for a court of equity, redress may be had there, the fraud charged being of that species which peculiarly belongs to that jurisdiction. Both by the common law and the statutes of fraud, fraudulent deeds, though void against others, are good as between the parties, and especially against the alienor.
Per Curiam
—If the wife had continued sole and brought this action, she must have been barred by her deed. As the *97husband brings the action in right of his wife, he can depend only upon such legal right as she had, and cannot, in this court at leasts, claim against her deed.
Let a nonsuit be entered.