Parris v. Thompson, 46 N.C. 57, 1 Jones 57 (1853)

Dec. 1853 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

46 N.C. 57, 1 Jones 57

WILLIAM PARRIS v. JOSEPH THOMPSON.

Where A. contracts for land, arul pays for the same, but has the title made t,o B-with a fraudulent intent to hinder and delay his creditors in the' collection of their debts, and afterwards, with the same fraudulent intent on the part of A., by his direction, conveys the land to C., who sells and convoys the same for a chattel: held, that this chattel cannot be taken by execution for the debt of A.

(Riiem v. Tull, 13 Ired. 57. Page v. Goodman, S' Ired. Eq. — cited and approved.) ,

This was an action of -troves, tried before Settle, Judge,at the Spring Term, 1853, of Alamance Superior Court-The plaintiff bought a mare from on'e Andrews, conveying' to him a tract of land in payment. The defendant, under an execution, levied on the mare, a’s the property of David Roach, and justified the' conversion, by producing judgments and executions in favor of Freeman and Williams, against Roach- The defendant proved that the land which the plaintiff gave for the mare, had been bought and paid for by Roach three years before, and that the deed to the land was made to one Sikes; that Sikes held the deed for two-years, but claimed no interest in the land; and that Roach received the rents and profits. Before the sale of the land to Andrews for the mare, Sikes conveyed the land to the plaintiff, in consideration of a note of $50 upon Roach, which note Sikes afterwards surrendered to Roach without receiving any consideration in return, and at tbe request of Roacb, made a deed to Parris for tbe land.

Roacb and-Parris lived together, and after Parris bought tbe mare, Roacb offered to trade her as bis own property.

His Honor charged, that if tbe jury believed tbe trade for tbe mare between Andrews and tbe plaintiff was a" fair and bona fide transaction, they should find for tbe plaintiff, and that tbe creditors of Roacb could not follorv the mare, as tbe proceeds of tbe sale of tbe land into tbe bands of tbe plaintiff; and that the plaintiff’s right could not be affected by any fraud in tbe sale of tbe land to Sykes, or to Parris, tbe plaintiff.

Verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment and appeal.

Ruffin and Nash, for the plaintiff.

J. N. Bryan, for tbe defendant.

Pearson, J.

We concur with bis Honor. Suppose there was bona fides in tbe transactions, by which Sikes, with tbe consent of Roach, conveyed tbe land to Parris, and took in payment therefor, a note of $50, due by Roach to Parris; then Roacb bad no further interest in the land: it belonged to Parris, and be became tbe owner of tbe mare, for which be gave tbe land in exchange.

Or,' suppose there was mala fides, (which is tbe view of tbe case as presented to tbe jury,) and that Roacb, when be paid for the land, had the title made to Sikes, for tbe purpose of defrauding creditors; and afterwards, with tbe same fraudulent intent, shifted tbe title into tbe bands of Par-ris, and to cover tbe transfer, concocted tbe note to serve as the ostensible consideration, paid by Parris, who, in fraud of creditors, held the land on a secret trust for Roach; and that, with' bis consent, he exchanged tbe land for ¿he mare and held her on tbe same seeret trust; Roacb had no interest which could be sold under executions, either by force of the Statute of Elizabeth, or of tbe act of 1812. This is settled. Rhem v. Tull, 13 Ired. 57. Page v. Goodman, 8 Ired. Eq. 16. It is true, the subject in tírese cases, was land; but there is no distinction between land and personal property in this particular.

The Statutes above referred to put both species of property on the same footing, and a case ’ like the present does not come within the operation of either.

Judgment affirmed.