Green v. Dibble, 46 N.C. 332, 1 Jones 332 (1854)

June 1854 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

46 N.C. 332, 1 Jones 332

ANNE E. GREEN v. CALVIN B. DIBBLE AND OTHERS.

A contract on hiring a slave from another, to guaranty against loss, accident of misfortune, arising from a habit of intoxication in the slave, embraces the ease of suicide, by drowning, in a fit of intoxication.

ActioN of Assumpsit for the value of a negro woman, slave, tried at Spring Term, 1854, of Lenoir Superior Court, before his Honor Judge Manly.

The defendants were co-partners in running a steamboat on the Neuse River: being in want of a cook on board the boat, they applied to the plaintiff to hire the woman in question for that business. The plaintiff at first refused to hire them the woman, on the ground that she was much addicted to drunkenness, and she was afraid the life on board a steamboat would increase the force of that vicious habit, and expose her to greater danger. Whereupon, the defendants assured the plaintiff that there could be no risk from this cause, as they never allowed spirits to be carried on board at all; and agreed with the plaintiff, that if she would hire them the negro, “ they would guaranty ■against all loss from that source,” and “ would pay all loss or damage from accident or misfortune, arising from that cause.” Upon this understanding and agreement, the woman in question went into the service of the defendants, as cook on board their boat. A few weeks afterwards, the woman became much intoxicated, and by reason thereof, in a fit of drunkenness, delusion or abstraction, jumped overboard, and was drowned. Plaintiff proved a demand and refusal by tbe defendants to pay anything for tbe loss of the woman.

Tbe defendants counsel took tbe ground, that tbe contract of .guaranty, did not apply to the case of suicide or self-destruction, though tbe act was immediately induced by intoxication from spirits. His Honor, however, held differently, and instructed the jury, that, upon the state of facts appearing in the case* the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant excepted to the charge of the Court, and obtained a rule for a venire de nove, which was discharged, and they appealed to this Court.

J. W. Bryan, with whom was Gfreen, for the plaintiff,

argued as follows:

The exception to the ruling in this case, is founded upon the opinion that this case is governed by the law applicable to Insurance upon Lives, and that such is the nature of this contract. Suicide, in such cases, is always an exception made in the contract. With respect to the risk which the underwriter is to run in insurance upon lives, this is usually inserted in the policy; and he undertakes to ansrver for all those accidents to which the life of man is exposed, unless the cestui que vie puts himself to death, or he die by the .hand of justice ; and these exceptions are always inserted in the policy. Park on Insurance, 491, ’92. This case differs entirely from such a contract. Here the defendant agreed to guaranty against all loss of property arising from the use of, or indulgence in, “ardent spirits” by that property, or to pay all loss and damage from accident or misfortune to that property from that source. Mania a potu, or fits of drunken delusion or desperation, are natural consequences of excessive indulgence in the use of spirituous liquors. The contract of the defendant embraced these consequences. Drunkenness, and the consequences incident to it in the sla\rc, were the perils the defendants insured against. These were the immediate, and not the remote, cause of the loss. Drunkenness brought about the loss. This was the vice of the slave or property Avhich the plaintiff guarded against in tbe contract, and tbe consequences of which tbe defendants insured against.

In an action upon a warranty of a chain cable, it was held .that tbe plaintiff might reccover the value of an anchor, which was lost through the insufficiency of the cable, proof being given that the ship would have been lost, if the anchor had not been slipped. Bonodaile v. Beaxton, 2 Moore 582; 8 Taun-ton 535; 3 Starkie on Ev. 1666; vide Coit v. Smith, 3 Johnson’s cases, 16.

Moore, for defendant.

Battle, J.

The loss sustained by the plaintiff is certainly within the terms of the guaranty made by the defendants, unless it be taken out of them by a necessary implication. The defendants contend that it is so excepted, because a case of self-destruction was not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and was impliedly excluded from it on grounds of public policy. The objection is founded, we presume, upon the practice of Life Insurance Companies, in excluding from their policies, losses arising from suicide: the assured’s “ dying by his own hands;” or his own act, “whether sane or insane.” The principle upon which that exclusion is founded, is thus stated : “ A stipulation to uphold a policy in case of wilful self-destruction, would be contrary to sound policy, as taking away one of the restraints operating on the mind of men against the commission of crimes, by the interest which they have in the welfare and prosperity of their connections; nay, more,- it would make those natural affections, which make every man desirous of providing for his family, an inducement to crime; for, the case may be well supposed of a person insuring his life for that purpose, with the intention of committing suicide. For a policy, moreover, to remain in force when death arose from any such cause, would be a fraud upon the insurers; for a man’s estate would thereby benefit by his own felonious act. ” It is manifest, however, that “where the policy is effected upon the life of a nominee, (a third person) tbe above reasoning fails. The insurance can be no inducement to the criminal act, and may reasonably be construed to cover this, as well as every other risk. There is, indeed, no reason why it should not do so; for the general tables of mortality, which form the basis of the calculations upon which the poliey is founded, include this, as well as every other ease of death, so that the particular risk is actually insured gainst. In policies, therefore, on the lives of nominees, it is very usually, but not invariably omitted.” Bunyon’s Life Assurance, 71 and 73, 69th vol.Law Lib.

In the case before us, the loss of the plaintiff’s slave by self-destruction is, as we have said, directly within the terms of the defendant’s guaranty, and we can see no good reason why it should be impliedly excluded from them upon any sound principle of morals or law. His Honor was thereforerright in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.