It is a well established rule in Equity, that where an answer to a bill, praying for an injunction, fully denies the plaintiff’s equity, the injunction must be dissolved. To have this effect, however, the whole equity must be denied. The statements of the answer must be credible and exhibit no attempt to evade the material charges of the bill. Sharpe v. King, 3 Ired. Eq. 402. If upon the hearing of the answer, the statements are such as to leave in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt, whether the plaintiff’s equity is sufficiently answered, the injunction will not be dissolved, but continued to the hearing. James v. Lemley, 2 Ire. Eq. 278. Mullen v. Washburn, 3 Ire. Eq. 161.
*70It is impossible in this case to say, that, if all the facts set forth in the defendant’s answer be true, the whole equity of the plaintiffs is denied, or that we have no doubt on the subject. The answer is so drawn, whether from haste or some other cause, we cannot tell, that it cannot have the effect desired by the defendant. It is unsatisfactory, and is, apparently, evasive — in no one instance meeting the averments of the bill, with a direct response, and in some material matters giving no reply whatever. Thus the plaintiffs state that Monroe andR. Melvin were the sureties of the constable, Willey M. Fort, on his official bond — the answer neither admits nor denies it; that Fort ranaway, and that they were held liable by him, the defendant, for the amount of the Reeves and Fort note — it makes no reply. In several other particulars it is defective in fulness and frankness, and is, therefore, unsatisfactory. For these reasons, alone, the injunction ought not to be dissolved. But enough does appear on the answer to entitle the plaintiffs to that aid from the Court, which they seek. The equity of the plaintiffs is, that, as sureties of the constable. Fort, on his official bond, they paid to the defendant, at his request, the amount of the Reeves and Fort note ; and that, under an agreement made by them with Mr. Hybart, the defendant’s attorney, that he would procure from the defendant a power of attorney authorising them so to do, they had instituted a suit in the name of the defendant against Reeves and Fort to reimburse themselves ; which suit the defendant threatens to dismiss. The answer admits, that Mr. Hybart was the defendant’s attorney to collect the money due on the note —that it was collected and paid over by Mr. Hybart to him; and that he has not, since its payment, had any elaim upon the note upon Reeves and Fort; and it, substantially, admits, that the defendant did execute a power of attorney to the plaintiffs Monroe'and Robert Melvin. This power of attorney is filed in the cause as an exhibit, *71and is witnessed by the defendant’s attorney, Mr. Iiybart, and fully authorized the use of his name by the sureties of the constable in the suit they had brought. The defendant then has no claim upon Reeves and Fort upon their note, and it is a matter of no importance, that Mr. Iiybart neglected to tell him, from whom he received the money — against the costs of the suit he is indemnified, for the delivery of the bond of indemnity to Mr. Hybart was a delivery to him. The defendant further admits, that he had directed Mr. Dobbin to dismiss the suit at law. This he had a clear legal right to do, being the plaintiff of record. It is a power, however, the exercise of which a Court of Equity will not permit, under the circumstances of this case. It will not suffer the defendant to interpose his mere legal right, to prevent the plaintiffs from their endeavor to ascertain their rights. 2 Sto. Eq. Sec. 903.
The equitable right of the plaintiffs to the aid they ask, is not shaken by the statements of the answer, but is rather strengthened and confirmed by the manner in which the averments of the bill are answered. The attempt of the defendant to dismiss the suit at law, is capricious, unjust and iniquitous.
We see no error in the interlocutory order appealed from.
The plaintiffs had in their hands the notes of Reeves and Fort and could have returned them to the defendant, and thus exonerated themselves from liability, as the sureties of the constable, for. any thing more than the actual damages arising to the defendant from the negligence of the constable. As there is no suggestion of the insolvency of the debtors at the time, those damages would have been but nominal. State v. Skinner, 3 Ire. 564. That would have been of no substantial benefit to the creditor, while it would have subjected the sure*72ties to the costs of an action. It was, therefore, thought by the plaintiffs, and by the defendant’s attorney and agent, to be best for all parties, that there should be no expensive, though fruitless, litigation between them ; and, to that end, that the sureties should make the debts their own, by paying the amount to the creditor, and it was agreed by the defendant’s attorney and agent, that, if the sureties would do so, they might, at their expense, sue the debtors on their notes in the name of the original creditor, the present defendant. That contract was accordingly made, and it was complied with by the present plaintiffs. Upon these facts a plain obligation arose on the defendant to fulfil the engagement of his agent, and allow the plaintiffs to recover the money from those, from whom it was really due, in his name, though for their benefit; and it is clear equity, that the defendant should be restrained from interfering with ihe plaintiffs’ efforts to do so, they indemnifying him against any costs of the action. Such is the State of the case between the parties, if the facts be as above supposed. That the facts are so, cannot be disputed in this stage of the cause ; because they are alleged in the bill, and the answer in no one particular denies them. It is true, the bill proceeds to say, that his attorney and agent further agreed with the plaintiffs, that the defendant would give the plaintiffs a written letter of attorney to prosecute in his name the suit which they immediately commenced on the notes ; and that the defendant approved of and confirmed the transaction of his agent, by subsequently executing the power of attorney. And it is also true, that the defendant answers to this latter matter, that he did not, by any act of his own, intend to confirm the alleged agreement of his agent, for it was not communicated to him: and that, if he executed any power of attorney, its contents and purpose were unknown to him. But that does not meet the plaintiffs’ equity at all; for those subsequent events are stated *73but as some of the evidences of, and the acts done under the original agreement with the agent, upon which the plaintiffs paid their money, whereby their equity arose. The answer, indeed, is not explicit as to those circumstances — not meeting the allegations of the bill on those points fairly, and denying or admitting them plainly; and, if the merits depended on those matters, the answer would not be sufficient to dissolve the injunction. But those are really but collateral circumstances, and, therefore,need not be particularly noticed : the substance of the case being the original agreement by the defendant's agent, and the payment of the money by the plaintiffs and receipt of it by the defendant under that agreement —which is not at all met by the answer. Therefore the order was right, and must stand affirmed, with costs in this Court.
Ordered to be certified accordingly.