Houton v. Holliday, 4 N.C. 87, 1 Car. L. Rep. 87 (1812)

Jan. 1812 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

4 N.C. 87, 1 Car. L. Rep. 87

Houton v. Holliday.

HENRY TAYLOR, by his will, dated 21st November, 1799, bequeathed to his daughter Lucy, a negro man Harry. In March, 1800, Taylor borrowed of William Holliday, the defendant, one hundred pounds, and to secure the payment, executed a deed of sale in the usual form, to which the following clause was added:

“The conditions of the above bill of sale is such, that if “the said Henry Taylor, his heirs, executors or "administrators, doth and shall well and truly pay to the said “William Holliday, or his heirs, on or before the 25th day “of December next, the sum of two hundred dollars, then “the above bill of sale to be null and void, otherwise to "remain in full force until the said Taylor doth pay the sum “of two hundred dollars. Signed, sealed and delivered, the “day and year first above written.”

“HENRY TAYLOR, Seal.”

“Test, Titus Car.”

Taylor died in April, 1800. His will was duly proved, and Micajah Edwards, the executor there in named, qualified in the same month. The plaintiff intermarried with the legatee, Lucy, in April, 1801; and upon the marriage, the executor of Taylor assented to the legacy of the negro Harry to the plaintiff. The negro Harry remained in the possession of the defendant, from March, 1800, until April, 1803, and is worth thirty pounds a year.

In April, 1803, the plaintiff paid Holliday (for which the negro was pledged) two hundred dollars, and the negro was delivered to him. He then demanded satisfaction for the services of the negro, which the defendant refused to make.

Upon this case the plaintiff brings his action, and declares,

1. For the wages of the negro, from the death of Henry Taylor, to the surrender by defendant in April, 1803.

2. For money had and received by defendant to plaintiff’s use, for the excess of what was paid defendant more than was due of the sum lent, allowing the wages of the negro annually to diminish the debt and interest.

The Jury, under the charge of the Court, found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of forty-eight pounds, estimated as the wages of the negro from the time of plaintiff’s marriage with Lucy, the legatee, until the delivery in April, 1803, deducting the interest of the sum borrowed for the same term. It is submitted to the opinion of the Supreme Court, whether the said verdict shall stand?

Taylor, C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court:

It has been the uniform practice of the Courts of Equity in this State, to make a mortgagee in possession account for the rents and profits, upon a bill filed for redemption. This is a necessary consequence of the principles which prevail in those courts relative to a mortgage, which is considered only as a security for money lent, and the mortgagee a trustee for the mortgagor. To sanction an opposite doctrine even in the cases of pledges, where the profits exceed the interest of the money lent, would be to furnish facilities for the evasion of the statute against usury, almost amounting to a repeal of that salutary law. Nothing can come more completely within the legal notion of a pledge, than the slave held by Holliday in the present case; for, by the very terms of the contract, it was so to continue until the money should be paid, no legal property vesting in Holliday, who had only a lien upon it to secure his debt. All the profits therefore, exceeding the interest of his debt; he received to the plaintiff’s use, and cannot conscientiously withhold. Wherever a man receives money belonging to another, without any valuable consideration given, the law implies that the person receiving, promised to account for it to the true owner; and the breach of such implied undertaking, is to be compensated for, in the present form of action, which is, according to Mr. Justice Blackstone, “a very extensive and beneficial remedy, applicable to almost “every case where a person has received money, which ex “equo et bono, he ought to refund.” Nor is its application to a case like the present without authority from direct adjudication. The case of Astley v. Reynolds, in Strange 915, furnishes an instance of a man’s being allowed to receive the surplus which he had paid beyond legal interest, in order to get possession of goods which he had pledged. In principle, the cases are the same; the only thing in which they differ is, that in the case before us, the money was received by the defendant from the labour of the pledge; in the other, it was paid by the plaintiffs. We therefore think the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.