The Legislature have thought proper to attempt the suppression of the practice of issuing due bills, as one extremely mischievous to the community; and one method they have adopted is, to make the person liable to an action, who issues a due bill for a less sum than ten shillings. It would materially weaken the effect *202of fliis law, and disarm it of its sting, if when such sepa-* rate acti°ns are brought, the Court should interpose a eon4 solidation rule. Such interference would be peculiarly improper in the present tase, in which the Plaintiff, by warranting and blending four dollars in each warrant, ha¿ pursued d touch less rigorous course, than he was allowed by law tó do.—This consideration, togethér with the stay of execution'which the «Defendant might have availed himself of, bad a larger sum been claimed in one warrant, induct us to concur in the opinion given by the judge Who heard the motion. His judgment on the motion is therefore affirmed.
Smith v. Bowell, 4 N.C. 200, 1 Taylor 200 (1817)
SMITH against BOWELL.
Where the yia.ntiffsued out sixteen warrants a- | gainst tlieDe-f'endant upon due bills, the highest ofthe warrants including only four dollars, tb e Court on motion refused to consolidate the warrants.
THE Plaintiff took out sixteen warrants against thp Defendant, fifteen of which were for four dollars each, and one for two dollars, upon due bills issued by him, all of the same tenor and date, but for different sums, the highest of which yvas twenty-five cents, and the lowest two*and an half cents, Upon the causes being taken by appeal to the County Court, an order was there made to consolidate them into two, from which Smith appealed to the1 Superior Court of Cumberland, w|iere upon the motion to consolidate being made before Sea well, J. he refused it,*and directed a procedendo to issue to the County Court, from which judgment Bowell appealed to this Court.
*201' # Shdrv, for the Appellant.
The Plaintiff might have comprised all' his causes of fcction in two warrants, without any inconvenience to him* Seif; it was oppression to issue so many,and ought to be discountenauced by the Court.* But the order of the County Court, directing a consolidation, was only interlocutory, and Could not be appealed from. The words of the act “order, sentence and decree” from which an appeal may be made, necessarily signify a final order, sentence, or decree, otherwise every collateral or incidental order made in the course of a trial, may be brought to this Court, which would lead to endless delay.
Henryk contra.
It does not appear from the record that these warrants are for the same causes of action ; neither the law nor practice requires declarations to be filed. The contracts are for different sums, and different defenses «may be made, as gaming, usury, &c.† The record does not show that the Defendant was held to bail, which was the ground of decision in the case cited. Had the Plaintiff warranted as it is desired, the Defendant might have stayed execution under the act of 1784 for six months Instead of twenty days ; and to have brought these warrants is less oppressive than to have sued in the Superior Court, which he might have done under the act of 1809, on each due bill. As to the competency of the appeal, the order of the County Court was in its nature final, for the existence of all the warrants was merged into two— they were judicially annihilated and no further steps could be taken in them.