Thigpen v. Balfour, 4 N.C. 112, 1 Car. L. Rep. 112 (1813)

Jan. 1813 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

4 N.C. 112, 1 Car. L. Rep. 112

Thigpen v. Balfour.

THE substance of this Bill in Equity to stay proceedings at law, was, that the complainant became bound, as surety for Causey in an obligation to Stringer for 42 dolls. 50 cts. payable in December, 1796. That Stringer removed to Georgia, and Causey to the County of Pitt, about forty miles from the complainant, who in consequence, heard nothing of the debt until 1804, when Balfour presented the obligation and demanded payment.

Stringer, after removing to Georgia, died, and the complainant understood, that Ruffin, a man of little worth either in character or property, went there, and in searching among Stringer’s papers found the bond, which he brought back and sold, or pretended to sell, to Balfour. The complainant to avoid a suit, with which Balfour threatened him, gave a new bond for the debt, and took up the old one which he believed still to be due, with which he applied to Causey for payment, who alledged that he had paid the debt to Stringer, soon after it was contracted, and that Stringer had informed him that he had destroyed the bond. Upon this, the complainant commenced a suit against Causey; but having learned since, that the debt really had been paid by him, he has abandoned the hope of recovery, and the bill charges his belief to be, that Balfour knew that the debt was paid.

The answer asserts that Ruffin paid a valuable consideration for the bond, and that the defendant also bought it fairly from him for £20, which Ruffin owed him; but not until the complainant had voluntarily agreed to give a new bond, upon a further day of payment being allowed. It denies all collusion with Ruffin, and also notibe of the payment of the first bond, when the second was given. It alledges, that the defendant could have secured the debt which Ruffin owed him, if the complainant had not consented to renew the bond, for that Ruffin was then in possession of property, but has since become insolvent—so that the defendant must lose his money if deprived of the benefit of the judgment. It further insists, that the complainant cannot rightfully claim the interposition of a Court of Equity for facts, which if true, would have formed a defence at law.

Upon several issues being made up and submitted to the jury, they found, that the defendant, when he purchased the old bond, had not notice that the debt was paid; but he had full notice of that fact, before he took the new bond payable to himself. They also found that Ruffin was solvent, from January, 1804, till the following April, shortly after which period he became insolvent.

The cause was submitted without argument.

Hall J.

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The Jury have found that at the time when the defendant purchased the old note, which had been executed by Causey and the complainant to Stringer, he had no knowledge of its having been discharged. Now if, by that purchase, he had obtained any legal advantage of the complainant, and one or the other must have suffered in consequence of Ruffin’s insolvency, Equity would not interfere, but leave the loss, where the law placed it. But, by that purchase he gained no legal advantage. He could not have recovered at law upon that note; for Thigpen had a good defence. Afterwards, during the solvency of Ruffin, the Jury find that the defendant had full notice that the note was discharged. Possessed of this knowledge, and before Ruffin’s insolvency, he procured the complainant to give him the note, on which he brought this suit, founded upon no other consideration than the circumstance of Thigpen’s having been security in the first note, to Stringer. Here was such a concealment of the true situation in which the parties stood, and such an attempt wrest money out of the complainant, without any consideration, when the defendant ought to have sought his remedy elsewhere, if Ruffin really owed him, that this court ought to interfere. I therefore think the defendant should be decreed to pay to the plaintiff the full amount of all the money which he received of the complainant, in consequence of the judgment obtained at law, with interest thereon from the time he received it, as well as all costs at law, which the complainant was legally bound to pay, together with the costs of this suit.