We concur in the opinion of the Judge below. The only question is as to the relation in which the defendant stood towards Massey, the man who inflicted the blow. The case is shortly this: The defendant was the owner of *307a mine, which be worked, and employed as his overseer, the man Massey. The plaintiff hired to him a negro boy, as a hand to work in the mine; Massey, for some alleged offence on the part of the boy, was abont to correct him, when, being tied, the boy made a motion to escape, when Massey struck him on the side of the head,, with a piece of wood, abont three feet long, and between two and threeinches thick. Massey was the defendant’s manager,, or overseer, and for every injury which- he does to the property of another, entrusted- to his care, in carrying- on the business ©f the defendant, which is the result of carelessness, ignorance, or want of skill, the latter is answerable. Massey had a right to correct the boy, Willie, and compel him to do his wqfk. The boy had left the mine without permission, under the allegation of being side. Whether he was in a condition to labour, Massey was the judge, and at the time, the sole judge, and it is but just to suppose, that, in the effort to punish the boy, he was satisfied that sickness ■was feigned by him. The act, therefore, of whipping or ■chastising the boy, was, on the pari of Massey,-a lawful one, to the extent of compelling him to work, and the owner of the boy has no right to complain ; but in the- correction, it was his duty to-do it properly, that is,in a pro-per manner, and with a proper instrument. If lie was negligent, or guilty ©f a want of care, in either particular, he is answerable for any permanent injury resulting to" the boy. True, Massey was guilty of great negligence in the use of an instrument, calculated, not to correct, but to kill. ■The responsibility, however, is not confined to Massey, but extends to his employer. Be was Iris selection, held out by him, to others, as a man, to whose skill and discretion, slaves could safely be entrusted, in carrying on the mining business; and the work was done for him. And the blow which caused the mischief, was given by Massey, in performance of the defendant’s business, and to compel an-*308attendance to it. It is not like the case of a servant, who, in driving his master’s carriage, voluntarily, and of his own head, leaves the track he is in, and runs over a man. The master, there, is not answerable, for the plain reason, that, in committing the trespass, the servant was not doing the, business his master had put. him about; Here Massey was doing the very thing, for which the defendant had employed him, to wit; overseeing the hands, and compelling them to the work in which they were engaged. In executing his duty, he was, in using the instrument he did, guilty of great negligence, and want of care, for which the defendant is answerable.
Much of the argument respected the liability of a- master for injuries to ,strangers from the wilful or negligent act of a servant. This, however, is not a case of that kind, but entirely different. It is a question between bailor and bailee for hire; and the plaintiff’s right to recover cannot be seriously doubted, upon the principles applicable to that relation. Such a bailee is entitled to make süch use, and bound to take such care, of the thing bailed, as persons of ordinary prudence usually do of their own. By that rule, the defendant must have been held liable, to the extent to which the value of the slave was permanently impaired, if he had himself inflieted the unreasonable and dangerous blow, with the deadly weapon, which his overseer gave, instead of resorting only to such moderate and usual correction, as would have reduced the slave to subordination,, and been of good example to other slaves. If the defendant would have been thus liable for the act, had it been that of his own hand, he is, as bailee, equally liable for it, as the act of one, to whose control and management he committed the slaves. If one hire, a horse* and work him excessively, or otherwise wantonly injure it, he is responsible for the damage, either upon his contract *309or in case. So, if he give it to his wagoner to drive, or lend him to a third person to drive in his wagon, and either of those persons over-work the beast, so that he die, or, in a passion at its restiveness or attempt to run away, maim it, inflict any lasting injury, the hirer would clearly be liable to the owner. It is true, the person, who did the deed, would be liable both to the hirer and the owner. But that cannot prevent the owner of his remedy against the hirer; since, by the contract, and also the obligations of the law, arising out of the relation between the parties, the hirer is bound to ordinary care, and he had no right to confide the property to a person, or his servant, or borrower from him, who would not treat it in the manner, in which he undertook it should be treated. The defendant was, therefore, bound for the care and conduct of his overseer towards this slave, as he was for his own; and the judgment should be affirmed.
Per CuRiAia. Judgment affirmed.