Stringer v. Burcham, 34 N.C. 41, 12 Ired. 41 (1851)

June 1851 · Supreme Court of North Carolina
34 N.C. 41, 12 Ired. 41

MAY STRINGER vs. SHEPHERD W. BURCHAM.

The plaintiff, a colored person, claimed to be free, and for the purpose of pro* vmg it, introduced a record of Craven County Court in 1807, setting forth a petition in the name of William Jessup, praying for liberty to emancipate certain slaves, owned by him, for meritorious services — the order of the Court that William Jessup have leave to emancipate the slaves mentioned, among whom was the slave by the name of Sinah — and the copy of th© bond filed, as directed by the act of 1796. Held, that the emancipation of the said Sinah was completely effected by these proceedings — that th© petition setting forth the master’s wish, then to emancipate for meritorious services, the judgment of the Court, and the granting to the master liberty to emancipate, being entered of record, make the liberation required by law.

Alter an acquiescence for thirty years by the public, in the enjoyment Of her freedom, every presumption is to be made in favor of her actual emancipation, especially against a trespasser and wrong-doer, *

The cases ol Bryan v Wadsworíh, 1 Dev. and Bat. 388, Sampson v Bur-grain, 3 Dev. and Bat. 28, and Gaily v Jones, 9 Ire. 169, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Carteret County, at the Spring Term, 1851, his Honor Judge Caldweli. presiding. 1

This suit is trespass for false imprisonment, the plaintiff alleging that she is a free person of color.

On the trial, in her behalf, a record, duly certified by the Clerk of Craven Coupty Court, was introduced, showing that, at December Term, 1807, of said Court, a petition was filed at the instance of one William Jessup,-by his Attorney, Owen Stanton, praying permission to emancipate certain of his slaves for meritorious services, and, amongst others, negro woman Sinah; that upon the hearing, it was decreed • according to the prayer, and bond given as directed by stat-' ute in such case provided. It was proved upon the trial, *42that the plaintiff was the daughter of Hannah, and Hannah was the daughter of Sinah, and was born after the decree of emancipation. And it also appeared that Sinah and her descendents had always passed for and were reputed free persons of color, since the said act of emancipation, except upon one occasion, a man, calling himself Jessup, and claiming to be the son of said William, the petitioner, came to Craven about 1817, and endeavored to carry off the said Hannah and one other: that he was arrested by virtue of process; whereupon he surrendered them and has not been since heard of.

The jury, under the charge of the Court, found in favor of the plaintiff. Rule for a new trial, upon the ground that said record is irregular and void. Rule discharged. Judgment on verdict. Appeal to the Supreme Court.

Donnell, for the plaintiff

J W. Bryan, for the defendant.

Nash, J.

Our attention is confined by the bill of exceptions to the sufficiency of the record offered in evidence by the plaintiff. The defendant objected to its competency, on the ground that it was irregular and void. In what particulars it is alleged to be so, we are not informed. The plaintiff claimed to be a free woman ; and, in order to prove it, she introduced a copy of the record of Craven Comity: Court, setting forth the proceedings, under which she claims her freedom. The record sets forth a petition in the name of William Jessup, praying for liberty to emancipate certain slaves owned by him, for meritorious services, the order of the Court, that William Jessup have leave to emancipate the slaves mentioned, and the copy of the bond filed, as directed by.the act of 1796. Those proceedings were had in 1807. In Bryan and Wadsworth, 1 Dev. and Bat. 388, the Court declares what, under the acts previous to 1807, *43should amount to an emancipation by the owner of a slave. These are the petition, setting forth the master’s wish, then to emancipate for meritorious services, the judgment of the Court, and the granting to the master liberty to emancipate. “ These, say the Court, “entered of record, make the liberation required by law. The slave is then freed by the master, under the license of the Court.” It was suggested, that an objection had been raised in the Court below to the regularity of the record, because the petition is not signed by William Jessup, but by his Attorney. That objection is answered by the case of Sampson v Burgwin, 3 Dev. and Bat. 28, in which it is declared by the Court, that the act of 1796 did not require a petition in writing. The one, however, set foith in the record is sufficient, if one were required. We think the record is neither irregular nor void, and that it was properly received in evidence.

From 1807, the mother of the plaintiff and her descendents have been, in the community in which they live, considered and treated as free persons. After a period of thirty years, the defendant, without a pretence of right, as far as we are informed, seized upon the plaintiff and questions her right to freedom. ■ After so long an acquiescence by the public in her enjoyment of her freedom, every presumption is to be made in favor of her actual emancipation, especially against a trespasser and wrong-doer — Cully v Jones, 9 Ire, 169.

We observe, that the bond filed by William Jessup refers only to Sinah, one of the negroes mentioned in the petition, and the case states that the plaintiff is her descendent, born „ after the emancipation.

There is no error in the judgment appealed from, which is accordingly affirmed.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.