No title passcdbyt.be sheriff’s sale. — • When the vendor retains the title, as a security for the purchase money, and a balance remains due, the vendee has not such a trust as is made liable to execution by the 1st section of the act of 1812,.so as to divest the legal title of the vendor. That was settled as soon as the aet passed. Consequently the constable’s levy was ineffectual, at the time it was made and returned. It follows, likewise, that the sale under the venditioni exponas was equally inoperative, notwithstanding the debtor may have acquired the legal title, while the sheriff had the latter writ in his hands. The case may be considered, as if the fierifacias had been issued from a Court of record and directed fo the sheriff'. The debtor’s interest in the premises could *459not have been sold or taken under it, at any time before its return, inasmuch as it was not subject to execution; and, if there had been a sale under the fieri facias, the subsequently acquired legal estate would have been unaffected by it, because the law only sells estates under its process, and not the chances- of an estoppel. Flynn v. Williams, Ire. 509 Gentry v. Wagstaff, 3 Dev. 270. It must be the same with the sale under the venditioni exponas, since that was founded upon the levy, which was made and returned, when the debtor had no estate. That results from the effects of a fieri facias on land and from the peculiarity o f the venditioni exponas. The levy of the fieri facias does not vest either the title or the possession of land in the sheriff, but merely confers on him the power to sell the debtor’s estate or interest, such as it is, while he has the writ in his hands before the return day. Barden v. McKinnie, 4 Hawks 279. If a title accrue to the debtor after the levy, but while the fi. fa. is in force, no doubt it may be sold, and will pass by the sale of the land, simply, without special reference to the new title ; for it is within the mandate of the writ under which the sale is made, ‘ffhat may be true, also, when a sale was not made on th of. fa., but on a venditioni exponas, but a title accrued to the debtor between the levy and the return of the fa. But it seems clear, that the venditioni exponas does not attach to an estate, acquired by the debtor after the return of the fieri facias. In respect to chattels, that writ confers no authority to take or even to sell them, but is merely to compel the sale of property before vested in the sheriff and in his possession, which he might sell without the writ. It is, indeed, otherwise in respect to realty. There the office of the writ is to confer an authority on the sheriff, as well as to compel him to sell.— But it is not an authority to take anything. It is merely to sell the land, and that only, which the levy of the fieri facias placed in custodia lefts, and appropriated to the *460satisfaction of the debt, and which is identified in the writ. The venditioni exponas, therefore, relates to the fieri facias, and is a warrant to the sheriff to do then, what he might have done under the fieri facias, while it was in force ; and it can have no other effect. Tarkinton v. Alexander, 2 Dev. & Bat. 57. Smith v. Spencer, 3 Ire. 265. The levy of the fieri facias created a specific lien on the estate of the debtor as it was at the teste of the writ and at any time between the teste and the return, which could not be enforced by virtue of the fieri facias, itself, as it might be as to personals, but required a ven-ditioni exponas for that purpose. Still the latter writ gave no more power to sell than the sheriff once had under the fieri facias, if he had exercised it, when he had the fieri facias ; because its object is only to have a sale of what was lawfully taken on the fieri facias, and nothing more. An estate in this land, which accrued after the venditioni exponas sued, is therefore no more subject to it than any other tract of land, purchased out and out in the interim, would be; for, in a legal sense, the one was no more levied on than the other. It is unnecessary, therefore, to enquire into the operation oFthe deeds between the defendant and Gordon, and Bond ; for supposing Gordon to have gained a title thereby, which was liable to execution, it was not liable to the particular execution, under which it was sold. For that reason the judgment must be affirmed.
Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.