Birch v. Howell, 30 N.C. 468, 8 Ired. 468 (1848)

Aug. 1848 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

30 N.C. 468, 8 Ired. 468

WILLIAM V. BIRCH vs. HOWELL AND ARMFIELD.

Where the principal sum in a promissory note is under one hundred dollars ( but the interest accrued makes the whole sum due on the note, upwards oí an hundred dollars, the County Court has jurisdiction of a suit brought upon such note.

The cases of Grijjin v. Inge, 3 Dev. 358, McCarter v. Quinn, 4 Ire. 43, and Clark v. Cameron, Ibid. 1G1, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Davie County, at the Spring Term, 1SJ.8, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.

This was an action of debt commenced in the County Court of Navie, upon a prommissory note for ninety-three dollars and ninety-one cents, on which there was due for interest at the time when the writ was issued, the sum of eight dollars and twenty-one cents, making the total amount of principal and interest, due on the note at that time, one hundred and two dollars and twelve cents. Upon the return of the writ, a motion was made to dismiss the suit, because it was alleged to be commenced upon a promissory note for a less sum than one hundred dollars, contrary to the provisions of the 41 section of the 31st Chapter of the Revised Statutes. The motion was sustained and the suit dismissed, when the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, in which a similar motion was made and sustained, and from the orders of dismission the plaintiff appealed to this Court.

Craigc, for the plaintiff.

Clarke, for the defendants.

Battle, J.

We think that the Court below erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. The 40tli section of the 31st chapter of the Revised Statutes enacts, that no suit shall be originally commenced in the County or Superior Court “for any sum of less value than one hundred dollars due by bond, promissory note, or liquidated account signed by the party to be charged thereby,” and the next succeeding section, to wit, the 41st, makes it the duty of the Court, if any suit shall commence therein “ for any sum of less value than one hundred dollars due by bond, promissory note,” &c. to dismiss it. In the Court below the value of a promissory note seemed to be considered the same as the principal sum due on it, without regard to the interest, and in that consisted the error. By the value of a note is meant what it is worth, and that must be both its principal and interest; otherwise all notes for the payment of the same amount of principal money, whether much, little or no interest is due upon them, will be of precisely the same value. This is certainly not so in fact, and it is not understood to be so in common parlance. This suit, then, having been commenced in the County Court upon a prommissory note of greater value than one hundred dollars, that Court had jurisdiction of it and ought not to have dismissed it, by reason of any thing contained in the 41st section of the Act referred to. But perhaps it may be contended the 6th Section of the 62nd Chapter of the Revised Statutes “concerning the power and jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace,” has taken away the original jurisdiction of the Courts over cases of this kind. That section gives to a single justice, out of Court, the power to take cognizance of, and determine, any suit commenced by warrant upon a promissory note, the principal sum due on which is less than one hundred dollars, though that, together with the interest, may be more than one hundred dollars ; but the section does not expressly, nor by any necessary implication, take away the jurisdiction of the courts, and consequently it remains and becomes concurrent. These pinciples are fully sustained by the cases of Griffin v. Inge, 3 Dev. Rep. 358, McCarter v. Quinn, 4 Ired. Rep. 43, and Clark v. Cameron, Ibid 161. The judgment of the Superior Court must be reversed, and the cause must be remanded for further proceeding therein according to law.

Per Curiam. Ordered accordingly.