State v. Daniel, 30 N.C. 21, 8 Ired. 21 (1847)

Dec. 1847 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

30 N.C. 21, 8 Ired. 21

THE STATE vs. WILLIAM DANIEL.

Where in a criminal case, in which, after conviction, the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment, and he appeals merely for delay, without filing any exceptions or making any defence in point of law, the Supreme Court thinks this an abuse of the right of appeal, and that the Superior Court should not admit the convict to bail during the pendency of the appeal.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Person County, at the Fall Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding.

This was an indictment against the defendant for an assault and battery, and, upon not guilty pleaded, he was convicted ; and the Court sentenced him to pay a fine of one hundred dollars and be imprisoned ten days, and enter into bond for his good behaviour, &c. From this judgment the defendant prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted upon his giving the usual ap« peal bond, conditioned that “ he would abide by the sentence, judgment or decree of the Supreme Court in the said suit.” No exception was made to the Judge’s charge, nor any motion in arrest of judgment made.

Attorney General, for the State.

No counsel for the defendant.

Ruffin, C. J.

The defendant was indicted for a battery on one Hopkins, and was convicted on not guilty pleaded, and sentenced to pay a fine of $ 100, and be imprisoned ten days, and he appealed to this Court.

Of course, the conviction is to be presumed right, in point of law, as well as in point of fact, since the defendant tendered no bill of exceptions. Therefore, there cannot be a venire de novo. Nor does the Court find any error in the record, for which the judgment should have been arrested. Indeed, none has been suggested on the part of the defendant; but he has given up the case. We conclude that the appeal was for delay merely ; and we notice it merely for the purpose of expressing our disapprobation of such an abuse of the right of appeal, and intimating the propriety in such cases of preve nting it by the Superior Courts refusing to let a convict to bail, since thereby the purposes of the lawin requiring offenders to be punished, are, in a considerable degree defeated, and the law evaded, and brought into contempt.

The usual certificate, that there is no error in the judgment, must be sent to the Superior Court, to the end that farther proceedings may be had there according to law.

PilR C URIAH. Ordered accordingly.