Defendant has brought forward a single assignment of error. By it he contends that the court erroneously admitted into evidence statements made to the police by him during the course of custodial interrogation. He argues that one cannot knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights under Miranda when he has not been informed of the charges which the police are investigating.
Counsel for defendant has ably urged that we adopt the rule set forth in Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mont. 1968). There the court held that a person being interrogated must be informed of the crime which he is suspected of having committed before he can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. As additional support for his position, defendant cites a line of cases from the state courts in Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Dixon, — Pa. —, 379 A. 2d 553 (1977); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A. 2d 351 (1974); Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114, 259 A. 2d 160 (1969). The Pennsylvania rule is that “the suspect need not have knowledge of the ‘technicalities’ of the criminal offense involved; rather, it is necessary only that he be aware of the ‘transaction’ involved.” Dixon, supra at 556.
The approach to Miranda taken in the cases cited by defendant does not appear to have been followed in other jurisdictions, and we likewise refuse to follow this minority rule.
*351 Miranda does not explicitly require that a person in custody be informed of the charges which the police are investigating. In Collins v. Brierly, 492 F. 2d 735 (3rd Cir., 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 140, 42 L.Ed. 2d 116 (1974), the defendant was the alleged driver of the getaway car used in a robbery perpetrated by him and three others. One of the four went into a lunchroom alone while the others waited in the car. The lone individual shot and killed the proprietor of the lunchroom. The others fled when they heard the shots. Later that same day, police went to defendant’s home and asked him to accompany them to the police station for questioning. He agreed to do so voluntarily. At the station, prior to being told that the investigation concerned a homicide, defendant signed a waiver of rights form. He then made statements which implicated him in the robbery and ultimately in the homicide by virtue of the application of the felony-murder rule. At trial the defendant argued that his statements were not admissible as he had not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. In response to this argument the court said:
“We have serious reservations about an interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, which would require that before custodial interrogation begins, in addition to the mandated declarations, a statement must be made by the police as to the nature of the crime under investigation. That landmark decision was painstakingly specific in listing the basic constitutional rights which the police must propound to a suspect before he is questioned. Nowhere is there the slightest indication that there must be included a warning about the nature of the crime which has led to the interrogation conference, what the penalty is for the offense, what the elements of the offense consist of, and similar matters. That these might be requisites for the entry of a valid guilty plea in open court is not relevant to the standards applicable to the custodial interrogation stage of a prosecution. In a sense, all of these elements might conceivably enter into an ‘intelligent and understanding’ rejection of an offer for the assistance of counsel, but the simple answer is that Miranda does not by its terms go so far. It requires that the accused be advised of his rights so that he may make a rational decision, not necessarily the best one or one that would be reached *352only after long and painstaking deliberation. Indeed, it may be argued forcefully that a choice by a defendant to forego the presence of counsel at a police interrogation is almost invariably an unintelligent course of action. It is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of ‘intelligent’ waiver but rather in the tenor that the individual must know of his available options before deciding what he thinks best suits his particular situation. In this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom. . . .”
A number of courts which have examined challenges to the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights where the defendant was not informed of the charges about which he was to be questioned prior to executing the purported waiver have reached the same result as that obtained in Collins. United States v. Anderson, 533 F. 2d 1210 (D.C. Cir., 1976); United States v. Campbell, 431 F. 2d 97 (9th Cir., 1970); United States Ex Rel. Smith v. Fogel, 403 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ill., 1975); State v. Allen, 111 Ariz. 546, 535 P. 2d 3 (1975); James v. State, 230 Ga. 29, 195 S.E. 2d 448 (1973); State v. Russell, 261 N.W. 2d 490 (Iowa, 1978); State v. Clough, 147 N.W. 2d 847, 259 Ia., 1351 (1967); Commonwealth v. Griswold, 358 N.E. 2d 482 (Mass. App., 1977); Commonwealth v. Tatro, 346 N.E. 2d 724 (Mass. App., 1976); Commonwealth v. Roy, 307 N.E. 2d 851, 2 Mass. App. 14 (1974); People v. MacDonald, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (1978); cf., United States v. Hall, 396 F. 2d 841 (4th Cir., 1968) (informing defendant of possible punishment prior to waiver of rights is not essential to make waiver knowing and intelligent).
We believe that Miranda not only lacks an explicit requirement that an individual be informed of the charges about which he is to be questioned prior to waiving his rights but also lacks any implicit requirement that such action be taken by authorities before a valid waiver of rights can be executed by one who is to be interrogated. Miranda “reflects the Supreme Court’s concern that an accused might, to his detriment, forfeit rights afforded him by the Constitution simply because he was not aware that he possessed such rights.” United States v. Hall, supra at 845; Collins, supra.
In the instant case the court specifically found that defendant was fully and accurately advised of his rights prior to answering any questions. Thus he was clearly aware that he had the right to *353refrain from answering questions at any time and to insist at that point on the presence of counsel. The language of the form which the defendant signed has been approved by this court. State v. McAllister, 287 N.C. 178, 214 S.E. 2d 75 (1975); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E. 2d 581 (1968). We also note that defendant had knowledge of his rights and was aware that the investigation concerned a homicide before he made the incriminating statement. Yet, he willingly continued to answer the questions put to him. The record reveals no point at which he expressed a desire for counsel or a desire to terminate the questioning. An individual in police custody must appraise for himself the import of the questions propounded to him and the significance of his answers to those questions. United States v. Anderson, supra-, People v. MacDonald, supra.
Finally, we do not rest our holding in this case on mere technical compliance with the requirements of Miranda-, standing alone that is insufficient, for the test of admissibility of an in-custody statement is whether from a consideration of the entire record it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E. 2d 152 (1976). We do not hold that the court need not consider the defendant’s awareness of the charges about which he is to be questioned in assessing the validity of a waiver of rights. Rather, that factor is one which must be considered in view of the totality of circumstances. Commonwealth v. Tatro, supra. The court in this case weighed this factor in light of the other facts in the case and concluded that defendant’s lack of knowledge of the charges, standing alone, was not sufficient to invalidate his waiver. The court found that the defendant’s statement, even without this information, was voluntarily made. The findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and cannot, therefore, be disturbed on appeal. State v. White, supra; State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E. 2d 453 (1967), death sentence vacated, 403 U.S. 948, 29 L.Ed. 2d 859, 91 S.Ct. 2278 (1971).
In defendant’s trial and the judgment appealed from, we find
No error.
Justice BROCK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
*354Justice EXUM dissents.