Armfield v. Tate, 29 N.C. 258, 7 Ired. 258 (1847)

June 1847 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

29 N.C. 258, 7 Ired. 258

ROBERT ARMFIELD vs. THOMAS R. TATE, Ex’r. &c.

Where an infant purchased land and gave his note for the purchase money, and, after he became of age, continued in possession of the land and promised to pay the note, Held, that this was a confirmation of the contract by the infant, after he became of age, and he and his representatives were bound by it.

The circumstance, that the vendor was informed, before the completion of the contract, that the vendee intended the piace as a residence for his kept mistress, does not vitiate the contract.

The law annexes no condition that the title-deeds shall be given, before a suit can be commenced on a note given for the purchase money.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Guilford County, at the Spring Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Manlt presiding.

This action was assumpsit with three counts. 1st, upon a promissory note, (a copy of which is annexed,) 2d, upon oral promises to pay the sums therein mentioned ; and 3d, upon a quantum valebat for a house and lot in the town of Greensborough. Pleas — the general issue and infancy, to which there were general replications, and to the latter the special replication, that defendant’s intestate had promised since arriving at fall age.

It was proved that the promissory note was given for a house and lot in the town of Greensborough, and at the same time a bond taken to make a title when the purchase money should be paid : That the intestate at the time was under age, but, after arriving at full age, continued to occupy and claim the lot as his property, and promised expressly to pay the purchase money. The defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff was informed, prior to the conclusion of the sale, that the premises were intended as a dwelling for a family, with one of the members of which the intestate was in the habit of illicit sexual intercourse, but the Court deemed the evidence immaterial and excluded it.

The defendant contended, that the plaintiff could not, in any event, recover the purchase money for the lot, and especially not until after a tender of a title deed. But the Court was of opinion, that the promise to pay, after arriving at full age, being established to the satisfaction of the j ury, the plaintiff was entitled, and so instructed tho jury. Verdict for the plaintiff. ■ There was a rule for a new trial, 1st. Because of the exclusion of proper testimonj". 2d. For misdirection by the Court. Rule discharged and appeal.

(Copy of Bond referred to.)

“ $350. One day after date, I promise to pay to Robert Armfield the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars to be paid as follows, one hundred the 1st day of January 1842, one hundred dollars the 1st day of January 1843, and one hundred and fifty dollars the first day of January A. D. 1844, ■with interest from date. Witness my hand and seal, this 24th February, A. D. 1841. (Signed,)

ABSALOM T. HUMPHREY.”

John Worth.”

[No seal attachedf]

No counsel for the plaintiff.

Morehcad, for the defendant.

Daniel, J.

All deeds for infants, which are merely voidable, may be affirmed at full age. MacPherson on Infancy 487. An infant may purchase land and the vendor or donor is bound by his own act or deed. Ib. 455. All contracts may be confirmed or adopted by an infant, after he arrives at full age. Ib. 487. The defendant’s intestate entered into the land, and continued the possession, after he arrived at full age. And he then promised to pay the note, which was given by him as the consideration for the land; this promise confirmed the contract on bis part, and repelled the plea of infancy.

Secondly. The plaintiff being .informed, before the completion of the contract, that the vendor intended the place as a residence for his kept mistress, does not destroy the contract. The way the vendor in fee intended to use his property, after he became the owner of it, would not prevent his paying the purchase money to the vendor, who had no control over the subsequent use of the land. The case cited by the defendant’s counsel was not like this case ; there, the lessor stipulated in the lease of his rooms, that the lessee might use them as a brothel. The Court held, that he could not recover the rent; because such a contract was against good morals, and void, as being against public policy. But here, the vendor enters into no stipulation, how the land is to be used; and he retained no reversionary interest in the land, as the lessor did in the case cited.

Thirdly. The title deeds were expressly agreed not to be given by the plaintiff, until the purchase money was paid. The law did not annex any condition precedent, that the title should be made, before suit could be commenced on the note, which is 'an independent security for the purchase money. The judgment must be affirmed.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.