In their brief, after stating quite accurately that they had brought forward “numerous assignments of error,” defendants assert that “the most prejudicial to the defendants were those that are brought forward from the charge.”
[1] Initially, defendants stress the fact that, although the indictments charged that Mrs. Richardson was kidnapped on December 17, 1970, all the evidence tends to show this occurred on December 10, 1970. As noted in our preliminary statement, defense counsel stated that he was fully aware that the State contended the crime was committed on December 10, 1970. He now contends that the trial of this case upon an indictment charging that the offense was committed on December 17, 1970, “played havoc with any alibi that the defendants might have had.” This contention is without substance since defendants were arrested during the early morning of December 11, 1970, and thereafter were in the custody of State or federal officers. Time was not of the essence of the offense and no prejudice to defendants was caused by the clerical error.
[2] Defendants’ brief further asserts that the trial judge’s “clearest error” was in charging “on two distinct separately indictable crimes (robbery and conspiracy) which neither of the defendants has ever been charged with . . . . ” Although defendants were not charged with conspiracy or with bank robbery, the facts tending to prove defendants’ participation in these two crimes constitute an integral part of the proof of the *281kidnapping for which they were indicted. The three crimes are so interwoven as to constitute one transaction or series of events. “It was not necessary, in order to submit to the jury the law as to criminal conspiracy, that the bill specifically charge conspiracy, if the evidence was sufficient to warrant this view. S. v. Triplett, 211 N.C. 105, 189 S.E. 123.” State v. Absher, 230 N.C. 598, 54 S.E. 2d 922 (1949). There can be no doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant findings that .the men who robbed the bank were acting in furtherance of a common purpose, design and unlawful conspiracy, and that this unlawful conspiracy included the means for escape with the fruits of the robbery. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of each defendant of the crime of kidnapping on the legal principle that, in the accomplishment of the purpose and design of an unlawful conspiracy, each conspirator is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators. Moreover, the judge correctly instructed the jury with reference to the principles of aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony. Apart from conspiracy, if the jury found that defendant Cox was guilty of the crime of kidnapping as principal, there was ample evidence to support the conviction of each of the others as an aider and abettor or principal in the second degree.
Defendants noted twenty exceptions to the charge. The excerpts to which they relate constitute a major portion of the charge. Although all have been considered, further discussion of these exceptions is unnecessary. The instructions are in substantial accord with our decisions. The assignments relating thereto are without merit.
[3] Mrs. Richardson and Mrs. Gray testified in detail as to what occurred at the bank when three men entered shortly after 4:30 p.m. on Thursday, December 10, 1970. The period covered by Mrs. Gray’s testimony relates to what occurred until Mrs. Richardson was taken from the bank by the three robbers. Mrs. Richardson’s testimony continues until she fell to the ground during the confrontation between the robbers and the pursuing officers. Both these witnesses testified they were unable to identify any of the defendants as being one of the three bank robbers.
Defendants excepted to and assigned as error all testimony of Mrs. Richardson and of Mrs. Gray referring to what “he” or “they” (that is, the unidentified robbers) did during the *282robbery of the bank and the kidnapping of Mrs. Richardson. Both women testified that the three men who robbed the bank were the men who kidnapped Mrs. Richardson. Their testimony was competent when considered in connection with other State’s evidence identifying defendants as the persons who robbed the bank and kidnapped Mrs. Richardson. These assignments are without merit.
[4] Defendants excepted to and assign as error the denial of their motions for a continuance and for a change of venue. These motions were addressed to the court’s discretion. State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 697, 174 S.E. 2d 526, 581 (1970); State v. Ray, 274 N.C. 556, 568, 164 S.E. 2d 457, 465 (1968). Defendants having failed to show abuse of discretion or prejudice, these assignments are overruled.
[5] Defendants excepted to and assign as error the overruling of their objections to certain questions on the ground the solicitor was leading the witness. “The allowance of leading questions is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his rulings will not be disturbed on appeal, at least in the absence of abuse of discretion.” State v. Painter, 265 N.C. 277, 284, 144 S.E. 2d 6, 11 (1965). Defendants having failed to show abuse of discretion or prejudice, these assignments are overruled.
[6] Defendants excepted to and assign as error the denial of their motion that the court conduct a voir dire hearing to determine the admissibility of Officer Ledbetter’s identification testimony. Absent evidence that Ledbetter had identified defendants in some pretrial lineup or confrontation, there was no basis for any contention that his in-court identification was in any way affected by such lineup or confrontation. Hence, this assignment is overruled.
Defendants excepted to and assign as error the admission of Officer Anderson’s in-court testimony that the three male occupants of the Buick were Cox, Ward and Johnson [Gary]. Defense counsel obtained permission to cross-examine Anderson in the absence of the jury concerning his identification of defendants shortly after their arrest by Greensboro police officers. In the course of this cross-examination Anderson testified that early in the morning of December 11th, when traveling toward Greensboro, he received a call from the Greensboro police; and *283that, in response to this call, he went to Meredith Drive and there found defendants Cox, Ward and Johnson [Gary], each in the back seat of a police car. He testified unequivocally that he based his in-court identification of defendants on his observation of them at the time of the gunfight, when he was approximately two car lengths from them. He further testified that “[he] knew them when [he] saw them” on Meredith Drive. Immediately following this statement, Anderson was asked, “Therefore, your testimony in court today, your identification is based partly on your observation of them in Greensboro in custody of the Greensboro police department?” Anderson answered: “Yes, sir.” When considered in context, we attach no significance to this answer, except that Anderson was simply saying that the men whom he had pursued a few hours before were the identical men who were now seated in the police cars.
Defendants contend that Anderson’s identification of defendants as the men whom he had pursued a few hours before was made under circumstances in the nature of a lineup or one-person confrontation; that defendants were not represented by counsel when Anderson identified them on Meredith Drive; and that the circumstances1 under which Anderson identified defendants were so suggestive as to render Anderson’s identification of defendants on Meredith Drive “unconstitutionally prejudicial.”
After hearing the cross-examination of Anderson by defendants’ counsel in the absence of the jury, Judge Johnston concluded that this was not a lineup or one-person confrontation within the meaning of the decisons of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967). Thereupon he overruled defendants’ objections to Anderson’s in-court identification testimony. Defendants’ assignments of error on this aspect of the case are addressed to the admission over objection of Anderson’s in-court identification testimony and to the court’s failure to find the facts as to the circumstances under which Anderson identified the defendants on Meredith Drive and as to whether his in-court identification testimony was tainted thereby.
[7] Defendants’ assignments of error in this connection are without merit. Of course, the accuracy and credibility of Ander*284son’s in-court identification testimony were proper subjects for cross-examination by defendants’ counsel and for resolution by the jury. However, we are unwilling to extend the decisions bearing upon exclusion of in-court identification testimony because tainted by illegal pretrial identifications to the present factual situation. Here officers engaged in the pursuit of fleeing criminals whom they had had every opportunity to observe soon thereafter identified persons intercepted by different officers as the persons who a few hours before had eluded their pursuit and arrest. The Wade and Gilbert decisions simply do not apply to this type of identification.
We note that the testimony of Anderson, elicited on cross-examination before the fury, clearly indicates his independent identification of defendants. This testimony contains references to the position and actions of defendant Cox during the pursuit of the Buick and to the actions of Cox from the time the Buick stopped until the three men fled into the woods. It further refers to the actions of the two men other than Cox after the Buick stopped and the occupants got out of it.
Defendants’ Assignments Nos. 14-17 relate to the testimony of FBI Agent Fairchild. He testified before the jury that, early in the morning of December 11, 1970, he went to Meredith Drive where the defendants were in the custody of the Greensboro police. He testified he then received from Officer Nixon the shotgun and [.22] pistol identified as State’s Exhibits Nos. 3 and 4 and also money in excess of $7,000.00 which was enclosed by “bank straps of the North Carolina National Bank” and wrapped in a black cloth, “possibly a woman’s skirt.”
Then, in the absence of the jury, Fairchild was cross-examined as to the circumstances under which defendant Cox made a statement later admitted into evidence over defendants’ objection. Fairchild’s testimony on voir dire is summarized below.
Fairchild talked to Cox at the City-County Jail in High Point around 5:30 a.m. on the morning of December 11, 1970. He advised Cox of his constitutional rights as set forth in the Miranda decision. Cox stated that he understood his rights and signed “a rights waiver form.” (Note: Fairchild testified “the rights waiver form” was not in the file he had with him but in a file at his office. The State did not produce the waiver form *285nor did the defendants request that it be produced.) The conversation of Fairchild and Cox related primarily to the bank robbery.
[9] The court found as a fact that the confession made by Cox to Fairchild was made voluntarily and after he had been fully warned of his Miranda, rights. Fairchild was then permitted to testify that during the course of their conversation defendant Cox stated, “in running through the woods after he left Mrs. Richardson’s car that he lost his pistol in the woods, a 38 revolver.” We find no evidence that a .38 pistol was used in the gun fight or that a .38 pistol was found in the woods. The implicating aspect of this testimony is that Cox was “running through the woods after he left Mrs. Richardson’s car.” Contrary to defendants’ appraisal, we think the admission of this testimony constitutes their more serious assignment because of the State’s failure to produce and offer in evidence at the voir dire hearing a written waiver by Cox in compliance with the statute then in effect and codified as G.S. 7A-457(a).
Later, Fairchild testified before the jury, over defendants’ objections, that each defendant had pleaded guilty in federal court to the robbery of the College Village branch of the North Carolina National Bank on December 10, 1970, and that each was there represented by separate and independent counsel when his guilty plea was entered.
[8] Defendants base their objection to the admission of the evidence of their guilty pleas in federal court on the general rule that in a prosecution for a particular crime the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense. They cite State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954), which states the general rule and the established exceptions thereto. The first exception, for which numerous prior decisions are cited, is stated in these words: “1. Evidence disclosing the commission by the accused of a crime other than the one charged is admissible when the two crimes are parts of the same transaction, and by reason thereof are so connected in point of time or circumstance that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other.” Id. at 174, 81 S.E. 2d at 366. The testimony under consideration fits this exception like a glove and illustrates its soundness.
*286Apart from the in-court identification testimony of the officers, Mrs. Richardson and Mrs. Gray testified unequivocally that the men who kidnapped Mrs. Richardson were the men who robbed the bank. Thus, their testimony, considered with defendants’ judicial admissions, identifies the defendants as the kidnappers. Moreover, the impact of this testimony must be considered in the light of these evidential facts: Anderson testified that, after the three men fled, a pillowcase full of money was found on the floor of the back seat of the Buiek directly behind the driver’s seat, and later some money was found in the woods into which the three men had fled. Officer Nixon testified that, on the occasion when the three defendants were apprehended in the woods in the Greensboro area, he, along with other Greensboro officers and at least one FBI agent, found in excess of $7,000.00 in a lady’s black skirt, sewed up at one end, which money had North Carolina National Bank wrappers on it.
[9] When the mass of evidence pointing to the guilt of the defendants is considered, we hold that errors, if any, in the admission of testimony, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L.Ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 31 L.Ed. 2d 340, 92 S.Ct. 1056 (1972); State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 423-24, 183 S.E. 2d 671, 677 (1971); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 340, 185 S.E. 2d 858, 869 (1972). It appears beyond a reasonable doubt that these defendants would have been convicted of the crime charged if the evidence challenged as erroneous were not in the case. Fairchild’s testimony as to Cox’s statement concerning his flight from Mrs. Richardson’s car was of negligible probative value when considered in the light of Cox’s plea of guilty of the bank robbery.
The assignments of error not discussed specifically herein have been considered. They do not disclose prejudicial error or merit discussion.
Defendants having failed to show prejudicial error, the verdict and judgment of the court below will not be disturbed.
No error.