State v. Woodfin, 27 N.C. 199, 5 Ired. 199 (1844)

Dec. 1844 · Supreme Court of North Carolina

27 N.C. 199, 5 Ired. 199

STATE vs. JOHN W. WOODFIN.

There can he no revision, either by appeal or certim-ari, of the judgment of a court of record for imposing a punishment for a contempt of the court, de-dared by the record to have been committed in open court.

The power to commit or fine for a contempt is essential to the existence of every court, and must necessarily be exercised in a summary manner.

The punishment for a contempt, and a conviction on an indictment for the same act, when a crime, are diverso ivMdtu,, and will stand together.

The case of the State v. Yancey, 1st Car. Law. Hep. 119, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Yancey County, at the Fall Term, 1844, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.

The defendant and another were finéd by the County Court of Yancy, for a contempt of the court, “by fighting in the yard of the court-house, before the court-house door, and in the presence of the court.” The défendant appealed to the Superior Court, where it was agreed by the Solicitor for the State, that the case should be presented to the Court, as upon a cer-tiorari. And on the motion of the solicitor to dismiss the case, on the ground that the matter was wholly in the discretion of the County Court,-and not subject to the supervision of the Superior Court, the defendant’s counsel contended that, although the quantum■! of punishment for contempt may be a matter entirely in the discretibri of the County Court, yet, whether the act of the defendant was a contempt or not might be enquired of by a court of appellate jurisdiction. It was further proposed to be shewn to the court, that the act complained of was not done, either in the presence of hearing of the court below, and that for the said act the defendant had been indicted and punished in the Superior Court.

The court was of opinion with the Solicitor, and- ordered the case to be dismissed, from which judgment the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Attorney General for the State.

No counsel in this Court for the defendant.

Ruffin, C. J.

The power to commit or fine for contempt is essential to the existence of every court. Business cannot be conducted, unless the court can suppress disturbances, and the only means of doing that is by immediate punishment. A breach of the peace in facie curiae is a direct disturbance and a palpable contempt of the authority of the court. It is a case that does not admit of delay, and the court would be without dignity, that did not punish it promptly and without trial. Necessarily there can be no inquiry de novo in another court, as to the truth of the fact. There is no mode provided for conducting such an enquiry. There is no prosecution, no plea, nor issue upon which there can be a trial. Indeed, the person is conclusively fixed with the act, for the record declares it to have been done in court, and the record is entitled to as much faith in that statement, as it is as to any other matter appearing by the record to have been transacted by or before the court. It mates it as certain, judicially speaking, that this person and another fought in the presence of the court, as that the court fined them therefor; and the fact cannot be controverted.

The State v. Yancy. 1 Law. Repos. 119, establishes, that punishment for a contempt, and a conviction on an indictment for the same act, when a crime, are diverso intuitu, and will stand together. Besides, the fine for the contempt was here the first laid, and therefore could not be affected by the subsequent proceeding by indictment.

• Admitting then, that this writ of certiorari would lie in any case of the kind,- it was properly refused in the present; which will be certified accordingly.

Per Curiam, Ordered to be certified accordingly.