Faggart asserts, ais his first ground of demurrer, that the 'Complaint does not 'allege a cause of action against him. If this be true, there is no misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E. 2d 295; Jordan v. Maynard, 231 N.C. 101, 56 S.E. 2d 26; Wetherington v. Motor Co., 240 N.C. 90, 81 S.E. 2d 267.
The complaint contains to allegation, of injury or damage proximately caused by the first collision, to wit, when plaintiff’s car was struck by .the car operated .by Faggart. Plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries caused by the second collision, to wit, when plaintiff’s oar was struck by the tractor-trailer operated by Futrell.
The complaint alleges .the second collision and plaintiff’s injuries were .proxiraately caused by the negligence of Futrell while acting as agent for .the corporate defendants. The crucial question is whether, upon the facts alleged, the alleged negligence of Faggart, conceding this negligence proximately .caused the first collision, may be considered a (concuraúng) proximate cause of the second collision. If not, plaintiff has alleged no cause of action against Faggart and his demurrer should be sustained on that ground, not for misjoinder of parties and causes of action.
“There may be two. or more .proximate causes of an injury. These may originate from separate and distinct sources or agencies operating independently of each other, yet if they join and concur in producing the result complained of, the author of each cause would be liable for the damages inflicted, and action may be brought against any one or all as joint tort-feasors.” Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 109, 66 S.E. 2d 690; Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 670, 91 S.E. 2d 894. “This *645principle is applicable when the facts 'are such ias to- justify the view that 'the several acts -o,f negligence on the part of two different persons concur in contributing proximately to the -injury complained of.” Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 201, 204, 87 S.E. 2d 253.
Plaintiff contends the facts alleged in the complaint support his 'allegations that the second collision was proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of all defendants. Paggant contend© it appears from the facts alleged' by plaintiff ithait the negligence of Futrell was the sole proximate cause of the second collision and that hi© (Tag-gart’©) negligence was not a concurring 'proximate cause.
“The doctrine of intervening negligence is well established in our law. Its essential element© and governing principles are well defined -and elaborately explained -in former decisions of this Count. Further elaboration here is unnecessary.” Riddle v. Artis, supra, and oases cited; Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E. 2d 598, anid cases- cited.
This Court, in Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 87, 6 S.E. 2d 808, and prior* cases, has quoted with approval this statement from the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in R. R. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475: “The question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a -continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury? It is admitted that tihe -rule i© difficult of application. But it is generally held, that, in order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an -act not amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was tihe natural and probable consequence of the negligence o-r wrongful act, a-nd that it -ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.”
The facts alleged disclose: As a result of the first collision, the plaintiff “was momentarily stunned and shocked.” When he “regained Iris senses,” hi© car “was .stopped crossways in the middle of said northbound lanes of traffic.” Upon regaining hie sense©, plaintiff proceeded to -drive his -car forward, to- turn to his left and to proceed into and along “the eastern or outside lane” for northbound traffic. The tractor-trailer operated by Futrell, traveling north, “approached plaintiff’s automobile on the eastern or outside Jane of .said highway, and he ran into the rear end of plaintiff’© automobile with such terrific force . . .” Futrell had “an unobstructed view of plaintiff and the scene of his peril” for a -distance of 900 feet. Notwithstanding, he did not -apply his brakes o-r slow -down but continued at a speed o-f more than- 60 miles per hour and -crashed into the rear of plaintiff’© oar.
*646Under the facts alleged, .the second collision did not occur when plaintiff’s car “was stopped c-rossways in the middle of said northbound lames of traffic.” Nor did it occur while plaintiff was “stunned and Shocked.” On the contrary, it occurred after plaintiff had “regained his senses” and had operated his car onto and was proceeding north along the eastern or outside lane for northbound traffic. Plaintiff had regained control of his car and wais operating it in the proper lane for northbound traffic when, the tractor-trailer operated by Futrall overtook plaintiff’s car and crashed into, the rear thereof. Fuhrell’s view of •these occurrences was unobstructed. Absent the first collision, if plaintiff, traveling south, had turned left, .crossed the median and turned left into and1 proceeded north along tire eastern or outside lane for northbound traffic bis car would have 'been in the same position as when overtaken and struck ’by the tractor-trailer. In our view, plaintiff’s factual allegations affirmatively disclose that negligence on the part off F-aggart in proximately causing the first collision was not a proximate cause of the second collision.
In Barber v. Wooten, supra, and in Riddle v. Artis, supra, the decisions stressed by plaintiff, demurrers interposed on the ground of misjoinder of parties and causes oif action were overruled. These cases are readily distinguishable. In Barber, the plaintiff was a passenger. In Riddle, tire plaintiff was an operator. In each, the complaint alleged the plaintiff was seriously injured and unable to. extricate -herself (himself) -as 'a result of the first collision. In each, it .appears ¡from the plaintiff’s allegations that the ¡car occupied by the plaintiff was not operated by anyone between the first 'and succeeding collision (s).
In ¡other decisions cited by plaintiff, the evidence was 'held sufficient to require submission -off an- issue -as to- the j oint and concurrent negligence of the defendants. In Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814, the plaintiff’s ¡intestate, a pedestrian, as a result of being struck by the icar ¡of defendant Hunter, was lying prostrate and unconscious in the ¡street when ¡struck by the car -off defendant Spears. In West v. Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551, the plaintiff’s intestate, a pedestrian, -was struck, knocked down and injured by the car of one defendant and while attempting to rise was struck by the truck of the other -defendants. Successive ooEisions are ¡not ¡involved in Tillman v. Bellamy, supra, and i-n Bumgardner v. Allison, 238 N.C. 621, 78 S.E. 2d 752.
While not cited by plaintiff, it seems .appropriate to. -refer to- Hall v. Coble Dairies, 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E. 2d 63, where ¡a judgment sustaining the defendants’ demurrer to- the -complaint was reversed. There, the complaint alleged that, as a .result of a collision proximately caus*647ed by the defendant's’ negligence, the plaintiff was “severely shocked and shaken upthat after getting out of his oar, tibe plaintiff was “still in a dazed and addled condition from shock caused by the collision;” and that, while in said condition, plaintiff was struck and injured by a ciar operated by an unidentified motorist.
Judge Giambill’s order overruling Faggart’s demurrer is erroneous land is vacated. Faiggartis demurrer should -have been sustained on the first ground asserted therein, namely, that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ag'ainst him, thereby eliminating the question ns to misjoinder of parties and causes of ■action. The cause is remanded with direction that such order be entered.
It 'is noted that defendant Futrell :an'd the corporate defendants are not parties to this appeal. This decision does not laffect fire pendency of the action as between plaintiff >amd these defendants or their rights and labilities inter se. In this connection, see Shaw v. Barnard, supra; Jordan v. Maynard, supra; Wetherington v. Motor Co., supra.