Plaintiff alleged 'the “trucks, rolling stock and other equipment” were in the State of Florida when defendant took posses'-*517sáon ‘amid control thereof. There is no allegation or 'contention that the action involves property located in North Carolina and -subj act to' the jurisdiction, of our courts.
Plaintiff’s action is for prohibitory and mandatory injunctive relief. “Injunction is distinctly an equitable remedy, and the well-established principle underlying equity jurisdiction that it is exercised in 'per-sonam, and not in rem, is fully applicable.” 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions § 4; 19 Am. Jur., Equity § 452; 43 C.J.S., Injunctions § 162; 30 C.J.S., Equity § 102.
Plaintiff contends the service by the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, in said county, was authorized by G.S. 1-104 and by G.S'. 55-33 (c) and conferred upon the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina, jurisdiction over the person of defendant. The court below so held.
The provisions of G.S. 1-104 are quoted and discussed by Denny, C.J., in Church v. Miller, 260 N.C. 331, 132 S.E. 2d 688. The purported service now under consideration was not made in accordance with the requirements thereof. No affidavit other than- the verified complaint was filed by plaintiff. The verified 'complaint ('treated as an affidavit) does not meet the requirements of G.S. 1-98.4. An affidavit in compliance with G.S. 1-98.4 is jurisdictional. Temple v. Temple, 246 N.C. 334, 98 S.E. 2d 314, and oases oited. The cause of action alleged by plaintiff is not one of the “kind® of actions and special proceedings” listed in G.S. 1-98.2 in which “service of process outside the State may be had.” There was no order “for service of process outside the State pursuant to G.S. 1-104.” See G.S. 1-99.
A-pairt from the foregoing, service in accordance with G.S. 1-104 would not confer -upon, the Superior Court of Wake County jurisdiction of the person of defendant and enable it to render a valid in per-sonam judgment. Church v. Miller, supra, and cases cited. As stated by Moore, J., in Burton v. Dixon, 259 N.C. 473, 479, 131 S.E. 2d 27, quoted with approval by Denny, C.J., in Church v. Miller, supra: “Jurisdiction of .a party in an action in personam, as ie .the instant -action, can only be acquired by personal service of process within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or by acceptance of service, or by general appearance, active or constructive. Warlick v. Reynolds, 151 N.C. 606, 66 S.E. 657. In -an -action in personam constructive service (by publication, or -personal service outside the State) upon -a nonresident i-s ineffectual for any purpose. Stevens v. Cecil, 214 N.C. 217, 199 S.E. 161; McIntosh: North Carolina Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 1956), s. 911, p. 479.”
*518G.S. 55-33 («), a provision of the “Business Corporation Act” (Session Laws of 1955, Chapter 1371), provides: “Every resident of this State who- shall become a director of a domestic .corporation and thereafter removes his residence from this State shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State in all actions or proceedings' brought therein by, or on behalf of, or against said corporation in which said director is a necessary or proper piarty, or in -any action or proceeding by sharehoIdeáis or creditors against said director for violation of his duty as a director.” Questions as ito the interpretation ,and validity of this statutory provision must be considered in relation to specific factual situations. This statutory provision refers to (1) actions in which a former resident of this State who- was and is a director of a domestic corporation is a necessary or proper party in his capacity a® such director and (2) actions by ¡shareholders or creditor® against a director for violation of his duty as such director. It has no .application to- the present case. Plaintiff alleged defendant was not a director when this action was commenced. The action is not for violation by defendant of his duty -as director but for alleged wrongful conduct of defendant (-in Florida) subsequent to. his removal from the .office of .director. Moreover, G.S. 55-33 (d) provides the exclusive method o.f service of process when iserviee of process is authorized by G.S. 55-33 (c). Hare, no attempt was made to- comply with G.S. 5-5-33 (d).
The court having acquired no jurisdiction, of .the person of defendant, the court erred in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss ¡and in entering am order' on the merits adverse to defendant. Accordingly, the said' orders of the court beloiw are reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of an -order dismissing the action.
Reversed and remanded.